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 Police Powers for Sale: 
Red-Light Enforcement Sold to the Foreign Bidder 
Andrea Franklin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Red-light cameras have been popping up all over major intersec-
tions and headlining news stories nationwide.  Undoubtedly, public 
outcry over this relatively innovative technology may be rooted in the 
conspiracy theorist’s Orwellian “Big Brother” notion that the gov-
ernment monitors the citizen and invades his personal freedoms; how-
ever, on a less-exaggerated notion, public outcry may be driven by the 
deep-seated belief that this new technology is inherently wrong.  
Many violators who received citations have challenged the consti-
tutionality of the whole red-light-camera program, but few, if any, have 
had any luck in the courtroom.1  Judges hearing appeals of violations 
have frequently disregarded statutory parameters and simply dis-
missed any disputed violations.2  Since the introduction of automated 
                                                                                                                           
 * This comment was authored by Andrea M. Franklin, a third-year law student at Florida 
International University College of Law. Special thanks to: Professor John Stack for encouraging 
me to continue researching after I thought the constitutionality of the red-light cameras was the 
end of the legal discussion on this topic; the FIU Law Review Editorial Board, Courtney Walter, 
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 1 See, e.g., Akbar v. Daley, No. 09-cv-1289, 2009 WL 3055322 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (finding state 
did not violate plaintiff’s right to equal protection merely because cameras were installed at 
some intersections); Williams v. Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-400, 2008 WL 782540 (E.D. 
Tenn. 2008) (finding plaintiff’s right to procedural due process was not violated by a $50 civil 
penalty for red-light-camera violation); Idris v. City of Chicago, No. 06-C-6085, 2008 WL 182248 
(N.D. Ill. 2008) (finding state’s imposition of vicarious liability on car owners, but not on car 
dealerships or lessors, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Agomo v. Fenty, 916 A.2d 
181 (D.C. 2007) (finding state’s statutory presumption of liability did not impinge on car owner’s 
right to due process). 
 2 See generally Jackelyn Barnard, Red Light Cameras Have Drivers Explaining Themselves 
in Courtht [sic], FIRST COAST NEWS (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.firstcoastnews.com/news/ 
local/article/234758/3/Think-Youve-Heard-it-All-A-Visit-to-Red-Light-Camera-Court; Brooke 
Edwards, California Courts Throwing Out Red Light Camera Tickets, VICTORVILLE DAILY PRESS 
(Jan. 22, 2011), http://www.vvdailypress.com/news/throwing-25536-california-tickets.html; Jane 
Musgrave, About 50 People Have Red-Light Camera Tickets Dismissed in West Palm and Palm 
Springs, SUN SENTINEL (Jan. 18, 2011), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2011-01-18/news/fl-palm-
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traffic detection systems, also known as traffic infraction detectors, 
including red-light cameras, a flurry of issues have arisen surrounding 
this relatively undeveloped and unarticulated legal debate.3  
The precedential case law is scarce and sparse around the entire 
nation.  Some states have banned the use of such automated systems; 
others have implemented programs utilizing the systems.  In almost 
every state where the systems have been implemented, petitioners 
have raised constitutional issues, albeit rather unsuccessfully, based on 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, Miranda rights 
and the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination, the 
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and sei-
zure, and various privacy issues stemming from state law.  Such claims 
rarely, if ever, prevail.  Legal scholars and political decision-makers 
have only recently begun to focus on the impact of these systems, es-
pecially in terms of legality and public policy.  
The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Highway Ad-
ministration has published Red Light Camera Systems: Operational 
Guidelines, but these guidelines are not binding and are merely sug-
gestive.4  Different states have exercised their police powers to enact 
legislation, which contain some uniformity with the federal guidelines 
but also contain particular regional specifications.5  
                                                                                                                           
red-light-cameras-folo-20110118_1_red-light-camera-tickets-red-light-intersections-last-year; 
Associated Press, Judge Dismisses Nearly 300 Red-Light Camera Tickets in San Diego (Sept. 5, 
2001), available at http://lubbockonline.com/stories/090501/upd_075-6389.shtml; 292 Red-Light 
Tickets Voided in Suit Over Automated Cameras, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 5, 2001, § News, at 12.  But see 
Dan Tracy & Scott Powers, Red-Light Camera Laws Enforced Erratically When It Comes to Right 
Turns, ORLANDO SENTINEL (May 14, 2011), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-05-
14/news/os-red-light-cameras-project-20110513_1_red-light-camera-tickets-motorists-appeal-
yellow-lights.  
 3 See generally Robin Miller, J.D., Annotation, Automated Traffic Enforcement Systems, 26 
A.L.R. 6TH 179 (2007). 
 4 U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., RED LIGHT CAMERA SYSTEMS: 
OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, Jan. 2005, available at http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/intersection/ 
redlight/cameras/fhwasa05002/fhwasa05002.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., OPERATIONAL 
GUIDELINES]. 
 5 Compare ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 27-52-110, -111 (2005) (permitting red light cameras for 
specific reasons, such as school zones or railroad crossings); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-
110.5(2)(g) (2004) (permitting cameras within a school zone, residential neighborhood, or along 
a street bordering a municipal park); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-809 (2011) (permitting 
cameras within a school zone or highway in a residential district); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
484.910 (2009) (permitting only handheld automated infraction detectors, such as radar detec-
tors, or automated detectors installed within law enforcement vehicle or facility), with N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 39:4-103.1 (2002) (prohibiting photo-radar enforcement); W. VA. CODE § 17C-6-7a (2007) 
(prohibiting “traffic law photo-monitoring device”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 349.02(3) (2005) (prohibit-
ing “photo radar speed detection”).  
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Specifically, Florida’s Mark Wandall Traffic Safety Act6 authorizes 
the use of automated traffic infraction detectors, but the Statute’s 
delegation to local authorities is broad and vaguely permissive.  Prior 
to the enactment of the Mark Wandall Act, in order to issue a traffic 
citation, a traffic enforcement officer was required to personally issue 
a citation for a violation that occurred in the presence of an officer; 
furthermore, the alleged violator was required to sign and accept the 
citation, constituting service and notice.7  Now, since the Act allows 
issuance of a citation without personal service and/or in the presence 
of a traffic enforcement officer, most local governments that imple-
mented red-light cameras have done so by outsourcing the operations 
and monitoring of the automated systems.8  
For example, the City of North Miami Beach instituted its Red 
Light Camera Program by outsourcing to an Arizona-based company 
who monitored violations through the use of road sensors and photo-
graphs; the City retained the right to review these citations, but for the 
most part, company technicians exercise substantial discretion in issu-
ing a citation.9  Notwithstanding whether the photographs have been 
reviewed by a traffic enforcement officer, a citation is issued based on 
the vehicle’s registration information.10  Overall, this delegation to pri-
vate entities, which are usually located outside the state, has been the 
growing trend for local enforcement of traffic violations.11  
                                                                                                                           
 6 FLA. STAT. § 316.0083 (2010). 
 7 See Letter from Charlie Crist, Att’y Gen., to Samuel Goren, City Att’y, Pembroke Pines, 
Fla. (July 12, 2005), AGO 2005-41, available at www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/ 
printview/CE01BE293FCEEA208525703C00720344. [hereinafter Letter from Charlie Crist]. 
 8 See, e.g., Memorandum from Louis Moore, Dir., Purchasing & Materials Mgmt., to City 
Council, St. Petersburg, Fla., (Apr. 21, 2011), available at http://www.stpetecameras.org/home/st-
pete-rlc-contract-with-ats [hereinafter Memorandum from Louis Moore]; CAPITAL 
IMPROVEMENTS PROGRAM, CITY OF MIAMI, Contract By and Between City of Miami & Am. 
Traffic Solutions, Inc. to Furnish, Install, Operate, and Maintain a Traffic Infraction Detector 
Program, Sept. 21, 2010, available at http://www.stpetecameras.org/home/st-pete-rlc-contract-with-ats 
[hereinafter City of Miami, Am. Traffic Solutions Contract]; ORANGE CNTY. PUB. WORKS DEP’T, 
TRAFFIC ENG’G DIV., Orange Cnty. Gov’t Florida Red-Light Running Pilot Project Summary, 
Draft Final Rep. Submitted to Orange Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Nov. 2008 [hereinafter Or-
ange Cnty., Pilot Project Report of Nov. 2008]. 
 9 Letter from V. Lynn Whitfield, City Att’y, N. Miami, to Mayor & City Council, (May 17, 
2011), available at http://www.northmiamifl.gov/Docs/AgendasMinutes/TABF05172011.pdf. 
 10 See discussion infra note 12. 
 11 See, e.g., Letter from Edmund T. Baxa, Jr., Foley & Lardner LLP, to Byron W. Brooks, 
AICP, Chief Admin. Officer, City of Orlando (Dec. 24, 2007), RFP 07-594, Request for Proposal 
for Red Light Violation Cameras and Citation System (on file with author); Letter from P.J. 
Lynch, LaserCraft Representative & Negotiator, to Althea Pemsel, M.A., C.P.M., Purchasing 
Agent III, Orlando, Fla., RFP 07-594, Red Light Violation Cameras and Citation System, Protest 
Responses (Dec. 13, 2007) (on file with author); Letter from James D. Tuton, President, Am. 
Traffic Solutions, to Jon Mead, C.P.M., Dir. Purchasing, Orlando, Fla., (Dec. 10, 2007), Notice of 
Protest, RFP No. 07-594, Red Light Violation Cameras and Citation System (on file with author). 
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This type of “outsourcing” of law enforcement has regarded these 
private firms as another arm of the executive branch.  Such privatiza-
tion of law enforcement poses substantial legal issues of municipality 
authority and administrative agency discretion. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
Despite the flurry of legal challenges to the automated systems, 
courts have been relatively reluctant to find the cameras unconstitu-
tional.12  
Nationwide, judges have generally rejected any claims of consti-
tutional violations.13  In theory, the judicial trend against the unconsti-
tutionality of the automated systems is indeed well-founded on and in 
accordance with the respective jurisprudence of the invoked provi-
sions in any given constitutionally based challenge.  
A. Equal Protection 
The Equal Protection Clause prevents state action that infringes 
on a person’s right to be “free from invidious discrimination in statu-
tory classifications and other governmental activity”14 and requires 
that “all similarly situated persons be treated in a similar manner.”15  
These oft-cited “catchphrases” are the touchstone earmarks of the 
Equal Protection’s constitutional requirements.  As such, the Court 
has developed a judicial framework for adjudicating constitutional 
challenges in a somewhat consistent, straightforward manner to pro-
mote clear-cut application.16  
Essentially, when a statutory classification involves neither a sus-
pect class nor a fundamental right, any constitutional challenge to that 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See, e.g., Akbar v. Daley, No. 09-cv-1289, 2009 WL 3055322 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (finding state 
did not violate plaintiff’s right to equal protection merely because cameras were installed at 
some intersections); Williams v. Redflex Traffic Sys, Inc., No. 3:06-cv-400, 2008 WL 782540 (E.D. 
Tenn. 2008) (finding plaintiff’s right to procedural due process was not violated by a $50 civil 
penalty for red-light-camera violation); Idris v. City of Chicago, No. 06-C-6085, 2008 WL 182248 
(N.D. Ill. 2008) (finding state’s imposing vicarious liability on car owners, but not car dealerships 
or lessors, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Agomo v. Fenty, 916 A.2d 181 (D.C. 
2007) (finding state’s statutory presumption of liability did not impinge on car owner’s right to 
due process). 
 13 See sources cited supra note 12.  
 14 Akbar, 2009 WL 3055322, at 3 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980)). 
 15 Id. (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)). 
 16 See generally, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (requiring strict-scrutiny standard 
to cases involving classifications based on race or national origin); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 
535 (1942) (requiring strict-scrutiny standard to cases involving a fundamental right); Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (requiring strict-scrutiny standard to cases involving racial classifica-
tion); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (requiring intermediate-scrutiny standard to sex-based 
classifications). 
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classification must overcome the rational-basis test—the least intru-
sive and most deferential of the Equal Protection’s standards of re-
view.17  Therefore, most classifications will pass constitutional muster 
under the Equal Protection Clause’s rational-basis test—unless, of 
course, the statutory classification is wholly irrational or completely 
unreasonable.18  
Based on this framework in the context of red-light camera con-
stitutional challenges, courts have expressly denied the possibility of 
heightened scrutiny for red-light camera programs: 1) “[t]he freedom 
to run a red light is not a fundamental right,”19 and 2) “individuals 
whose vehicles have been photographed violating the red light ordi-
nance” are not members of a suspect class.20  
Accordingly, the appropriate standard for red-light camera chal-
lenges based on the Equal Protection Clause is the rational-basis test; 
thus, the issue presented is whether the use of automated traffic in-
fraction detectors is rationally related to a legitimate government in-
terest.21 
In Idris v. City of Chicago, plaintiffs claimed the city’s automated 
system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution because the red-light program provided a defense for car 
dealerships and manufacturers, yet not to other vehicle owners, “i.e., 
the defense that a car caught running a red light was formally leased 
to another person creates a legislative classification that ‘lack[s] any 
rational basis, and render[s] the ordinance invalid on its face.’”
 22  
In Idris, the city’s ordinance provided that a car dealership or 
manufacturer could not be vicariously liable for a lessee’s violation, 
whereas other vehicle owners could be vicariously liable for the viola-
tion, notwithstanding whether the car’s owner was the actual driver at 
the time of the alleged violation captured by the automated system.23  
The Idris court applied the rational-basis test for the constitu-
tional challenge since plaintiffs did not, nor could they, argue for 
heightened scrutiny based on a suspect class or a fundamental right.24  
                                                                                                                           
 17 Id. 
 18 See generally, Romer v. Evans 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (finding rational-basis test was the 
least demanding of the Equal Protection tests); Ry Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 
106 (1949) (finding rational-basis test for most classifications appropriate).   
 19 Mills v. City of Springfield, No. 2:10–CV–04036–NKL, 2010 WL 3526208, at *6 (W.D. Mo. 
2010). 
 20 Id. at *7. 
 21 See generally id.; Akbar v. Daley, No. 09-cv-1289, 2009 WL 3055322 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Idris 
v. City of Chicago, No. 06-C-6085, 2008 WL 182248 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
 22 Idris, 2008 WL 182248. 
 23 See id. 
 24 Id. 
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Accordingly, the court acknowledged the standard that plaintiffs face 
in challenging a red light camera program based on the Equal Protec-
tion Clause: “plaintiff[s] attempting to invalidate a statutory classifica-
tion under the rational basis test face an uphill battle and must ‘nega-
tive every conceivable basis which might support it.’”25  
In a similarly unsuccessful claim, plaintiffs in Akbar v. Daley chal-
lenged the use of automated traffic infraction detectors installed in 
one part of the city yet not in another part—essentially, an allegedly 
unconstitutional classification between persons driving in the down-
town area of the city and persons driving in the city but outside the 
downtown area.26  The Akbar court characterized the purported classi-
fication as “problematic” because persons in both classifications are 
“constantly . . . in flux.”27  
Moreover, since Equal Protection challenges to statutorily cre-
ated classifications are generally concerned with “legislation whose 
purpose or effect is to create discrete and objectively identifiable 
classes,”28 plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a constitutionally infirm classi-
fication since a driver’s classification “may be discrete and identifiable 
at one moment in time . . . but would change from moment to mo-
ment”; thus, a driver could “easily transition from protected class to 
discriminated class by driving a few blocks.”29  
After the Akbar court rejected plaintiffs’ classification of drivers 
affected by the automated systems, the court nonetheless noted plain-
tiffs’ significant burden even if the court accepted plaintiffs’ classifica-
tion claim: unless the municipal ordinance involves members of a sus-
pect class or affects a fundamental right, the municipality need only 
meet the rational basis standard in order to justify its actions.
 30   
Subtly yet distinctively, the Akbar court wholly dismissed the pos-
sibility that a suspect class or a fundamental right could possibly exist 
in this case.31  
                                                                                                                           
 25 See id. at *4 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993) (quoting Lehnhausen v. 
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)). 
 26 Akbar, 2009 WL 3055322, at *3 (citing Enquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 
601 (2008); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60 (1973) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring) (“[T]he basic concern of the Equal Protection Clause is with state legislation whose pur-
pose or effect is to create discrete and objectively identifiable classes.”).  
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. (emphasis added by court) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 60 (Stew-
art, J., concurring)). 
 29 Id. (citing Enquist, 553 U.S. at 601 and San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 60 
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“The basic concern of the Equal Protection Clause is with state legisla-
tion whose purpose or effect is to create discrete and objectively identifiable classes.”). 
 30 Id. at 4.  
 31 See id. at 6. 
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Without a constitutional challenge based on a suspect class or a 
fundamental right, plaintiffs will almost inevitably face the heavy bur-
den of showing that these automated systems are not rationally based 
on the state’s interest in preventing car crashes caused by red-light 
running.  Accordingly, the rational-basis test is essentially the “road-
block” to a plaintiff’s constitutional challenge based on the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the 14th Amendment. 
So long as the municipality provides a rational basis for imple-
menting the use of automated infraction detectors, its actions follow-
ing therefrom will remain relatively unscathed by the necessities of 
the Equal Protection Clause.  The municipality may assert its “rational 
basis” for red-light cameras without even calling in its legal team: red-
light running causes accidents and is illegal.  Even if the simplicity of 
this basis may actually be nothing more than smoke and mirrors,32 
judges are relatively unwilling to delve into the complexities of traffic 
engineering and statistics.33  
                                                                                                                           
 32 See generally Christine Vendel, Police Study Suggests Red-Light Cameras Don’t Add To 
Safety, THE KANSAS CITY STAR (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.kansascity.com/ 
2012/01/23/3387905/kc-police-study-suggests-red-light.html; James Baxter, Red-Light Cameras 
Do Not Reduce Right Angle Crashes, NAT’L MOTORISTS ASS’N BLOG (Nov. 25, 2008), 
http://blog.motorists.org/red-light-cameras-do-not-reduce-right-angle-crashes/ (last visited Dec. 
22, 2012); Red Light Cameras Linked To Crashes: Red Light Cameras Used To Nab Drivers Who 
Disobey Traffic Signals Can Lead To More Accidents and Injuries, According To Researchers at 
The University of South Florida College of Public Health,  THE CALGARY HERALD (Mar. 14, 
2008), http://www.canada.com/calgaryherald/news/story.html?id=b8a238d6-ab4b-401a-87c2-
cfd524789502; Red-Light Cameras Increase Accidents: 5 Studies That Prove It, NAT’L MOTORISTS 
ASS’N BLOG (Jan. 8, 2008), http://blog.motorists.org/red-light-cameras-increase-accidents-5-
studies-that-prove-it/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2013); Associated Press, Critics Point To Downside of 
Red Light Monitoring Cameras - Rear-End Accidents, (Sept. 26, 2004), available at 
http://production.daily-jeff.com/local%20news/2004/09/27/critics-point-to-downside-of-red-light-
monitoring-cameras-rear-end-accidents.  But see Associated Press, Study Finds Red Light Cam-
eras Cut Fatal Crashes (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.nola.com/traffic/index.ssf/2011/02/ 
study_finds_red_light_cameras.html; Chuck Squatriglia, Study Says Red Light Cameras Save 
Lives, WIRED.COM (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.wired.com/autopia/2011/02/study-says-red-light-
cameras-save-lives/; Nedra Pickler, Researchers Find Big Drop in Speeding After Cameras De-
ployed, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 1, 2002, available at Associated Press Archive.   
 33 See, e.g., Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564, 566 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Is it rational to fine 
the owner rather than the driver?  Certainly so.  A camera can show reliably which cars and 
trucks go through red lights but is less likely to show who was driving. . . .  A system of photo-
graphic evidence reduces the costs of law enforcement and increases the proportion of all traffic 
offenses that are detected; these benefits can be achieved only if the owner is held responsible.”); 
Mills v. City of Springfield, No. 2:10–CV–04036–NKL, 2010 WL 3526208, at *6 (W.D. Mo. 2010) 
(“Clearly, a legislative body could find that improved surveillance and enforcement of red light 
violations would result in fewer accidents.”); Akbar v. Daley, No. 09-cv-1289, 2009 WL 3055322, at 
*4 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“Because Defendant has presented possible reasons that would justify the 
classification and Plaintiff has failed to ‘allege facts sufficient to overcome the presumption of 
rationality,’ Plaintiff's equal protection challenge must fail.”) (citing Wroblewski v. City of 
Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 460 (7th Cir. 1992); Shavitz v. City of High Point, 270 F. Supp. 2d 702, 715 
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Therefore, plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of auto-
mated traffic infraction detectors must establish that the rational basis 
of traffic safety can somehow outweigh an individual’s interest in pay-
ing the civil penalty for an infraction or appealing the authenticity of 
photographic evidence of an alleged red-light violation.  Such an ar-
gument has not been made; arguably, such an argument cannot be 
made because the safety of drivers carries substantially more weight 
than any single individual interest.  
B. Due Process 
Generally, based on the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in 
Mathews v. Eldridge, in order to determine whether a state’s proce-
dures adequately provide due process, a trial court will apply the 
three-prong Mathews balancing test: 1) whether an individual’s inter-
est is affected by state action; 2) whether the procedure used increases 
the risk of erroneously depriving this interest, and if so, whether an 
alternative or additional procedural safeguard yields a more probable 
value; and 3) whether an additional safeguard imposes a burden on 
the state’s fiscal and administrative interest.34  
Although figuratively referred to as a “balancing test,” where the 
individual’s interest is weighed against the government’s interest, the 
notion of balancing in this context is essentially placing a mouse and 
an elephant on opposite ends of a playground seesaw.  
In Williams v. Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc., plaintiffs filed suit 
against Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc., a private company, as well as the 
city contracting with the company.35  Plaintiffs claimed the city’s red-
light-camera program violated their constitutional right to due proc-
ess.36  Without reaching the issue of the actual red light camera system 
underlying the claim, the Tennessee appellate court addressed the ap-
propriate standard applied for such a claim:  
In order to state a claim for denial of procedural due process, a 
plaintiff must first establish that she has been deprived of a prop-
erty or liberty interest.  In this case, the property interest at issue 
presumably lies in the $50 ‘civil penalty’ that was assessed against 
[plaintiffs].37 
                                                                                                                           
(M.D.N.C. 2003) (“Defendants [the City] have put forth significant evidence indicating that the 
goal of the ordinance is to promote public safety.”). 
 34 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 35 Williams v. Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-400, 2008 WL 782540, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. 
2008). 
 36 Id. at *3. 
 37 Id. at *4 (citing Bd. of Regents of State College. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972)). 
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Accordingly, the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the viola-
tions violated their right to due process, finding that the plaintiffs’ 
purported property interest could not outweigh the state’s interest in 
traffic safety.38  
Similarly unsuccessful, plaintiffs in the District of Columbia 
claimed a due process violation based on the state’s statutory scheme 
for issuance and appeal of citations issued by the automated systems.39  
In Agomo v. Fenty, the red-light-camera program in question 
bears substantial similarity to the general standardized approach to 
issuance of citations in most states that have permitted the use of 
automated systems: based on the owner-responsibility scheme, the 
owner of the vehicle received a notice of the infraction captured by 
the cameras; the notice informs the vehicle owner that he shall be li-
able for payment of the citation unless he could provide evidence that 
his vehicle was in the custody or control of another person; further, 
the notice must provide the date, time, location, license plate number, 
and the photo images showing the violation occurred; and, after re-
ceiving the notice, the vehicle owner could request a hearing to appeal 
the citation; however, failure to pay or otherwise appeal constituted an 
admission of liability.40  
Challenging this standard approach, plaintiffs in Agomo alleged a 
due process violation based on the “presumption of guilt” in the 
owner-responsibility scheme.41  [Although not addressed in the court’s 
opinion, plaintiffs’ use of the word “guilty,” in and of itself, is mis-
placed.  The issue of civil liability versus criminal guilt is a dispositive 
distinction and is discussed in greater detail below.]  
In order to determine whether plaintiffs’ due process rights had 
been violated by the red-light-camera program, the court found that, 
under the Mathews balancing test, plaintiffs’ due process rights were 
not violated because of a failure to provide notice or a deprivation of 
the opportunity to be heard.42  The court explained that “(a) the plain-
tiffs received notices of infraction in advance of any determinations of 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Id. 
 39 Agomo v. Fenty, 916 A.2d 181 (D.C. 2007). 
 40 See, e.g., City of Miami, Am. Traffic Solutions Contract, supra note 8; AMERICAN 
TRAFFIC SOLUTIONS, Contract Between City of Ocoee & Am. Traffic Solutions, Inc. Pertaining 
to Red Light Running Camera Enforcement System, July 23, 2010 [hereinafter City of Ocoee, 
Am. Traffic Solutions Contract]; AMERICAN TRAFFIC SOLUTIONS, Contract Between City of Ft. 
Lauderdale & Am. Traffic Solutions, Inc., July 7, 2010 [hereinafter City of Ft. Lauderdale, Am. 
Traffic Solutions Contract]. 
 41 Agomo, 916 A.2d at 188. 
 42 Id. at 190. 
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liability, (b) that the notices contained an accurate identification of the 
vehicle, and (c) a clear description of the asserted violation.”43  
The Agomo court noted that the plaintiffs’ due process challenge 
was not based on the procedure for issuance and appeal of a citation, 
but rather that the program “instead creates a statutory presumption 
of liability, whereby the identity of the driver is irrelevant, and that 
this system therefore violates due process and conflicts with the re-
quirements in other sections of the traffic code that require the iden-
tity of the driver to be proved before liability can be assessed.”44  Ul-
timately, the court found that the statute created a rebuttable pre-
sumption of vicarious liability and, accordingly, noted that “the Su-
preme Court has long held that on their face, systems of vicarious li-
ability that impose civil liability are not contrary to the notions of due 
process.”45  
The Agomo court referred to the plaintiff’s interest as a “modest 
fine,” whereas the government emphatically asserted its interest in 
preventing traffic accidents and ensuring safety on its roadways.46  This 
notion of balancing interests is commonly and consistently invoked in 
courts nationwide.  Since the public outcry against the red light pro-
grams has focused on the individual’s rights, judges could consistently 
and steadfastly reject individual constitutional challenges.  
C. Civil Versus Criminal Offenses 
Since a state may exercise its police power to regulate and main-
tain traffic safety, a state may also exercise its power to identify con-
duct threatening traffic safety and to characterize such conduct as a 
civil or criminal offense.  Notwithstanding the traditional common-law 
principles of criminal law, a municipal code infraction may constitute a 
criminal offense in one state yet constitute a civil offense in another.  
Therefore, the cases arising from statutory implementation of red-
light cameras vary markedly nationwide based on whether the ena-
bling legislation defines a red-light violation as criminal or civil in na-
ture.  
In the context of automated traffic-infraction systems, the distinc-
tion between a civil and a criminal penalty is crucially determinative, 
insofar as such a distinction variedly implicates different constitu-
tional requirements.  This civil-criminal distinction is crucial because 
“[i]f the penalty is indeed criminal, then a panoply of federal constitu-
                                                                                                                           
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 191. 
 45 Id. at 193. 
 46 Id. 
2012] Police Powers for Sale 147 
tional rights, including rights to confrontation and rights against self-
incrimination, arise.”47  Basically, whether an infraction captured by a 
red-light camera constitutes a civil or criminal offense determines the 
nature and extent of the process due to the alleged violator.  
Generally, municipal code citations, such as parking tickets, are 
classified as civil in nature and, thus, municipalities “need not provide 
the heightened procedural protections required by the Fifth, Sixth, 
and Eighth Amendments” of the Constitution.48  However, a traffic 
citation, such as a moving violation, may be classified as a criminal 
offense and, as such, implicate the requirements of the Fifth Amend-
ment’s protection from self-crimination, the Sixth Amendment’s right 
to confront one’s accusers, and the Eighth Amendment’s proscription 
of cruel and unusual punishment.49  
Upon receiving citations for violations captured by red-light 
cameras, petitioners in Shavitz v. City of High Point challenged a city 
ordinance implementing “traffic control photographic systems” au-
thorized by state legislation.50  The enabling act permitting such an 
ordinance required that violations detected by photographic systems 
“be deemed a noncriminal violation for which a civil penalty of fifty 
dollars ($50.00) shall be assessed. . . .”51 
In determining whether monies collected for violations captured 
by red-light cameras constituted a criminal or civil penalty, the Shavitz 
court dismissed the argument that such a distinction could be based 
on whether the ordinance referred to the $50.00 assessment as a “fine” 
or a “penalty.”52  The court found the more significant analysis must 
require more than the labels attached to the violation.53  Accordingly, 
the court emphasized: “The crux of the distinction lies in the nature of 
the offense committed, and not in the method employed by the mu-
nicipality to collect fines for the commission of the offense.”54  
Nonetheless, the Shavitz court disregarded as “immaterial” the 
fact that a violation of the red-light ordinance was also a violation of 
the state statute, which provided that red-light running was unlawful.55  
Moreover, the court found that, notwithstanding whether the violation 
is punishable as an infraction, subject to state penalty, or as a civil as-
                                                                                                                           
 47 Williams v. Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-400, 2008 WL 782540, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. 
2008). 
 48 City of Creve Coeur v. Nottebrok, 356 S.W.3d 252 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2011). 
 49 See generally Williams, 2008 WL 782540.  
 50 Shavitz v. City of High Point, 270 F. Supp. 2d 702 (M.D.N.C. 2003). 
 51 Id. at 713. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 712. 
 54 Id. at 728 (citing Cauble v. Asheville, 271 S.E.2d 258, 260 (1980)). 
 55 Id. at 715. 
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sessment, subject to city penalty, “monetary payments are nevertheless 
‘imposed to deter future violations and to extract retribution from the 
violator’ for [his] transgression.”56 
Ultimately, the Shavitz court held the $50.00 assessment consti-
tuted a civil penalty.57  In contrast to the majority of courts determin-
ing the proper distinction of a given violation, the Shavitz court’s 
characterization of the distinction between criminal and civil penalties 
was seemingly result-driven, considering the state’s constitution re-
quired municipalities to allocate a portion of the proceeds of civil 
penalties to the state’s educational system.58  
Notwithstanding the anomalous Shavitz analysis, the majority of 
cases identifying the distinction between civil and criminal offenses 
invoke the oft-cited Supreme Court analysis in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez.59  In order to determine whether the penalty for photo-
captured, red-light infractions is civil or criminal, courts have applied 
what has been referred to as the “Mendoza-Martinez” factors: 1) 
whether the penalty “involves an affirmative disability or restraint”; 2) 
whether such penalty has “historically been regarded as punishment”; 
3) whether it depends on a “finding of scienter”; 4) whether it operates 
to “promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deter-
rence”; 5) whether the penalized conduct is “already a crime”; 6) 
whether the penalty has “an alternative purpose to which it may ra-
tionally be connected”; and 7) whether it “appears excessive in rela-
tion to the alternative purpose assigned.”60 
Considering these factors in order to determine whether the 
sanction imposed for photo-captured infraction is for a civil or crimi-
nal violation, the court in Mills v. City of Springfield found that the 
red-light sanction did not “impose a physical restraint but merely a 
monetary penalty” and that such penalty “does not resemble the pun-
ishment of imprisonment, which is the paradigmatic affirmative dis-
ability or restraint.”61  In swiftly glossing over the first and second 
Mendoza-Martinez inquiries, the court found that the penalty imposed 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Id. (citing North Carolina Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. Moore, 614 S.E.2d 504, 517 (N.C. 2005)). 
 57 Id. at 716-17. 
 58 Id. at 724. 
 59 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).  See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997); City of 
Creve Couer v. Nottebrok, 356 S.W.3d 252, 258 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2011); Mills v. City of Spring-
field, No. 2:10–CV–04036–NKL, 2010 WL 3526208, at *8 (W.D. Mo. 2010); Kilper v. City of Ar-
nold, No. 4:08cv0267 TCM, 2009 WL 2208404, at *13 (E.D. Mo. 2009); Mendenhall v. City of 
Akron, Nos. 5:06 CV 139, 5:06 CV 154, 2008 WL 7484179, at *3 (N.D. Ohio 2008). 
 60 Mills, 2010 WL 3526208, at *8 (citing Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997); Ken-
nedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)). 
 61 Mills, 2010 WL 3526208, at *9  (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 86 (2003)). 
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was a “mere $100 fine,”62 and that “[m]oney penalties have not histori-
cally been viewed as punishment.”63  
In terms of the other Mendoza-Martinez factors, the inquiry as to 
whether the sanction will “promote the traditional aims of punish-
ment-retribution and deterrence” is the “lone factor that cuts in favor 
of [plaintiffs] as to suggest that the ordinance is criminal in nature.”64  
Nonetheless, the “mere presence of a [deterrent] purpose is insuffi-
cient to render a sanction criminal, as deterrence ‘may serve civil as 
well as criminal goals.’”65  Furthermore, according to the Mills court, 
because such sanctions do not require a showing of scienter, the mere 
penalty cannot reasonably be intended as retribution.66 
In considering the “alternative purpose” inquiry of the Mendoza-
Martinez factors, the Mills court exercised judicial restraint by defer-
ring to the legislature: “[c]learly, a legislative body could find that im-
proved surveillance and enforcement of red light violations would 
result in fewer accidents.”67  Nevertheless, in the court’s view, even if 
the use of red-light cameras does not actually promote its purpose, the 
sanction is not deemed punitive merely because it lacks a perfect or 
even close fit.68  Accordingly, the Mills court found the use of traffic 
infraction detectors is “rationally connected to the legitimate non-
punitive purpose of reducing traffic accidents at traffic light intersec-
tions.”69  
The Mills court’s gloss-over of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, and 
its characterization of the “mere” penalty and the “mere” fact that it 
lacks a perfect, or even close, fit to its purpose of promoting public 
safety, are clear indicators of the court’s inclination towards legislative 
deference in the context of challenges to the use of red-light camera.70  
Arguably, this trend reflects the underlying notion of judicial restraint, 
wherein courts have been consistently reluctant to second-guess the 
legislature’s decision to implement automated traffic infraction detec-
tors. 
However, does this judicial trend necessarily assert that auto-
mated systems are here to stay?  Insofar as the civil-criminal distinc-
tion, legislative entities can steer clear of any serious constitutional 
                                                                                                                           
 62 Id. (emphasis added).  
 63 Id. at *10. 
 64 Id. (citing Shavitz v. City of High Point, 270 F. Supp. 2d 702, 715 (M.D. N.C. 2003)). 
 65 Id. (citing Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 105 (1997)) (emphasis added). 
 66 Id. (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362 (1997)). 
 67 Id. at *7. 
 68 Id. at *11 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003)). 
 69 Id. at *11 (citing Kilper v. City of Arnold, 2009 WL 2208404, at *17 (E.D. Mo. 2009)). 
 70 See id. 
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infirmities by imposing sanctions expressly labeled as “civil” in nature, 
eliminating the stricter requirements attached to criminal sanctions.  
Specifically, by imposing civil, non-punitive sanctions for photo-
captured violations, the state avoids the implications of criminal liabil-
ity: 1) the Confrontation Clause is inoperative, notwithstanding, after 
all, that the alleged violator cannot confront his “accuser” — the cam-
era that captured his violation; 2) the Fifth Amendment’s protection 
against self-incrimination is inoperative, insofar as incrimination nec-
essarily involves underlying conduct that is criminal in nature; and 3) 
the Due Process Clause requires a markedly lesser degree of  “proc-
ess” in the context of civil infractions. 
Arguably, the implementation of automated traffic systems may 
pass constitutional muster in terms of violations of individual rights, 
yet the legal inquiry does not reach a dead-end merely because the 
automated systems themselves are theoretically constitutional.  The 
issue turns on the complexities of administrative law and the intra-
state relations of local governments, law enforcement and private 
companies. 
Although the majority of challenges to the use of automated traf-
fic detectors have focused on individual rights, a few, rare challenges 
have been raised against a state or local authority for entering into a 
contract with a private third party.71  In two factually similar cases, 
plaintiffs filed suit against ACS State and Local Solutions, Inc., the 
company providing “traffic signal enforcement systems to municipali-
                                                                                                                           
 71 See, e.g. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Nassau Cnty. Traffic & Parking Violations 
Agency, 34 Misc.3d 844, 849 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) (“If the insurance company wishes to obtain 
information gathered through the Red Light Camera Program in anticipation of future litigation, 
it may do so at their own expense directly through the vendor.”); People v. Daugherty, 199 Cal. 
App. 4th Supp. 1, 4 (Cal. App. Div. Super. Ct. 2011) (finding the “cost-neutrality” provision of 
contract between city and Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc. improperly incentivized issuance of citations 
by compensating the company based on the number of citations generated); Wiles v. Ascom 
Transp. Sys., Inc., No. 3:10–CV–28–H., 2011 WL 672652, at *3 (W.D. Ky. 2011) (rejecting argument 
that company was a private actor acting as a state actor “under color of law”); Jadeja v. Redflex 
Traffic Sys., Inc., 764 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (rejecting plaintiffs’ challenge based 
on an alleged “legally protected interest in freedom from unfair or unlawful business practices 
which led to the inclusion of the cost-neutral clause in the contract between Redflex and Menlo 
Park”); Kennedy v. Polumbo, 704 S.E.2d 916, 925 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (ruling in favor of city and 
private company, asserting that “it is immune as a matter of law because it installed the red-light 
camera with proper care and skill pursuant to its contract with the City”); Ward v. ACS State & 
Local Solutions, Inc., 328 S.W.3d 648, 653 (Texas App. 2010) (finding summary judgment was 
appropriate because plaintiffs failed to establish company’s “failure to acquire a license would or 
could have any exclusionary effect on the admissibility of the evidence concerning the red light 
violation”); Verrando v. ACS State & Local Solutions, Inc., No. 3:08–CV–2241–G., 2009 WL 
2958370, at *4 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (finding plaintiffs failed to establish causal connection between 
company’s failure to acquire license and plaintiffs’ alleged injury). 
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ties,” asserting negligence per se based on the company’s failure to 
acquire the proper occupational license required by state law.72 
Whereas most challenges are filed by an alleged violator who 
outright denies liability, plaintiffs in Verrando and Ward did not con-
test their respective violations and the consequential fine imposed, 
nor did they challenge the accuracy of the company’s automated sys-
tems that captured their cars in the intersection after the traffic signals 
had turned to red.73  Rather, plaintiffs argued that the photographs 
were impermissible evidence since the company did not have the 
state-mandated occupational license for an entity that acts as an “in-
vestigations company.”74  
Essentially, in both Verrando and Ward, plaintiffs arguments were 
“premised on the notion that, but for the operation of the ACS-
installed, red-light camera, no citation would have been issued.”75  
Ironically, and unsuccessfully, plaintiffs attempted to establish the 
company’s liability by asserting the injury they suffered - the civil fine 
imposed - occurred when they unlawfully ran a red light.76  The courts 
rejected such claims by stating matter-of-factly: “[P]laintiffs do not 
have a legally protected right to engage in illegal conduct and be free 
from the consequences.”77  
Ultimately, plaintiffs’ unsuccessful attempts to exclude evidence 
acquired through the unlicensed company’s automated camera system 
were fatal-by-design: in order to avoid the civil penalty imposed for 
photo-captured infraction, plaintiffs emphatically focused on the 
company’s failure to comply with the state’s occupational code, while 
simultaneously disregarded their liability for the actual violation un-
derlying the entire claim.78 
Notwithstanding the obvious infirmity of challenging automated 
camera systems without contesting the infraction issued therefrom, 
plaintiffs have filed suit, albeit ultimately unsuccessfully, against mu-
nicipalities based on their contractual relationship with a private com-
pany to operate the entire red-light-camera program, including not 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See Ward, 328 S.W.3d 648; Verrando, 2009 WL 2958370. 
 73 See sources cited supra note 72. 
 74 Ward, 328 S.W.3d at 651 (citing TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1702.101 (2004) (“Chapter 1702 
requires that any person who acts as an ‘investigations company’ obtain an investigations com-
pany license.”)). 
 75 Ward, 328 S.W.3d at 652; see also Verrando, 2009 WL 2958370. 
 76 See sources cited supra note 75. 
 77 Verrando, 2009 WL 2958370,at *3 (citing Bell v. Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc., No. 4:08-CV-
444-MHS-DDB, at 5 (E.D. Tex. Mar., 25, 2009) (unpublished opinion)). 
 78 Id. 
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only installation and maintenance, but also image review, issuance of 
citations, and collections of fines imposed for violations.79 
Plaintiffs in Leonte alleged that the private company performed 
all the tasks of the automated program without any involvement by 
the city.80  However, the court rejected the argument based on the con-
tract with the city that showed it “retains the right to ‘monitor, evalu-
ate, and provide guidance to the CONTRACTOR in the performance 
of’ the contract and ‘the right of access to all activities and facilities 
operated by the CONTRACTOR under this Agreement’ and to ‘all 
files, records, and other documents related to the performance of this 
Agreement.’”81 
Although the Leonte court ultimately upheld the contract’s valid-
ity as it pertained to plaintiffs’ due process claim, the court did not 
necessarily delve into the issue of whether the city’s “retaining the 
right” actually had legal force or was merely a passive “right” that 
could be invoked at the whim of a city official, yet otherwise a dor-
mant right that was neither required nor necessarily invoked during 
the duration of the contract.82 
III. FLORIDA’S TRAFFIC SAFETY ACT  
The Mark Wandall Traffic Safety Act enables “local departments, 
municipalities, and agencies” to implement automated traffic-
enforcement technology, namely, red-light cameras.83  Interpreting the 
Act broadly, a majority of local authorities have contracted with pri-
vate, third-party contractors to install, maintain, and/or operate red-
                                                                                                                           
 79 See, e.g., Leonte v. ACS State & Local Solutions, Inc., 123 Cal. App. 4th 521, 528 (2d Cal. 
Ct. App. 2004). 
 80 Id. 
 81 See id. at 527 (“We believe that the statutory purpose of authorizing the use of auto-
mated traffic enforcement systems is best served by a construction of ‘operate’ that allows a 
governmental agency to hire private contractors to perform a broad range of functions.  We 
therefore conclude that former Vehicle Code section 21455.5 did not prohibit a governmental 
agency from hiring a private company to perform functions in connection with the operation of 
an automated traffic enforcement system provided that the governmental agency retained the 
right to oversee and control the functioning of the system and thereby ultimately was the system 
operator.  A governmental agency retains the right to oversee and control the functioning of the 
system if it retains the right to ensure satisfactory performance through such means as the right 
to inspect, the right to make suggestions as to the details of the contractor’s performance, and 
the right to terminate the contract.”). 
 82 See id. at 526 (“The parties dispute the meaning of the italicized language and particu-
larly the meaning of the word ‘operate,’ which former Vehicle Code section 21455.5 did not 
define.”  “Former Vehicle Code section 21455.5 (Stats. 2001, ch. 496, § 1) authorized the use of 
automated traffic enforcement systems at intersections where drivers are required to stop.  Sub-
division (a) of the statute stated in part, ‘[o]nly a governmental agency, in cooperation with a law 
enforcement agency, may operate an automated enforcement system.’”). 
 83 FLA. STAT. § 316.0083 (2010). 
2012] Police Powers for Sale 153 
light-camera programs.84  Although some local authorities have en-
acted ordinances to limit the discretion of these private entities, other 
local authorities, including major metropolitan areas such as the City 
of Miami, have entered into agreements that delegate substantial dis-
cretion to private entities located outside the State of Florida.85 
Although the legislature contemplated the presence of private 
contractors in the initial implementation of the red-light programs 
within the enactment of the Act, this mere presence cannot be said to 
encompass the role of the private contractor as has been broadly con-
strued by individual municipalities and counties.  
A. Legislative Intent 
The question is: did the Florida Legislature intend for “local de-
partments, municipalities, and agencies” to also include a delegation of 
similar authority to “manufacturers and vendors” referred to else-
where in the Act? 
The role of “vendors and manufacturers”86 within the definition of 
the Act was intended to refer to the companies supplying and install-
ing the equipment.  Further, in some cases, the role of the vendor 
and/or manufacturer may, in fact, exist beyond the initial installation, 
but this continued relationship between the vendor or manufacturer, 
and the municipality or county, was intended for purposes of “mainte-
nance” of the equipment hardware itself.87  
In analyzing the fiscal impact of the Act on local governments, 
the legislature acknowledged the possibility for the municipality or 
county to contract with a private vendor:  
If local governments choose to enact ordinances to permit the 
use of traffic infraction detectors, there will be a fiscal impact to 
the local governments for the cost of the installation and mainte-
nance of the devices.  The impact will vary depending on the ne-
                                                                                                                           
 84 See, e.g., Memorandum from Lisa R. Rhea, P.E., Dir. Pub. Works, to Bruce T. Haddock, 
City Mgr., Oldsmar, Fla. (Nov. 30, 2011), available at  http://www.myoldsmar.com/ 
Pages/Agendas/OldsmarFL_CouncilAgendas/12062011/Item005.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum 
from Lisa R. Rhea]; Memorandum from Alex Rey, Town Mgr., to Mayor & Town Council, Miami 
Lakes, Fla. (July 12, 2011), available at http://www.miamilakes-fl.gov/pdfs/Agendas/2011/2011-07-
12-agenda-packet.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum from Alex Rey]; Memorandum from Louis 
Moore, supra note 8; City of Miami, Am. Traffic Solutions Contract, supra note 8; Orange Cnty., 
Pilot Project Report of Nov. 2008, supra note 8. 
 85 E.g., City of Miami, Am. Traffic Solutions Contract, supra note 8. 
 86 FLA. STAT. § 316.0083 (2010). 
 87 See, e.g., H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, Mar. 9, 2010, H.R. 325, 2010 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010). 
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gotiated agreement between the local government and any pri-
vate vendor providing equipment.88 
This pre-enactment recognition of private vendors providing 
equipment was eventually sanctified in the Uniform Traffic Control 
Code’s provision for “transitional implementation” of automated in-
fraction detectors after enactment of the Act.89  The provision initially 
sets forth the general mandate for post-enactment implementation of 
the systems, insofar as “any traffic infraction detector deployed on the 
highways, streets, and roads of [the] state must meet specification es-
tablished by the Department of Transportation. . . .”90  
However, recognizing the pre-enactment installation of such 
automated detectors, the “transitional implementation” legislative 
mandate includes two exemptions for any equipment, either: 1) “ac-
quired by purchase, lease, or other arrangement under an agreement 
entered into by a county or municipality on or before July 1, 2011”; or 
2) “used to enforce an ordinance enacted by a county or municipality 
on or before July 1, 2011.”91  Accordingly, if such exemptions apply, the 
equipment is “not required to meet the specifications established by 
the Department of Transportation until July 1, 2011.”92 
Based on the legislative history and subsequent legislation there-
from, the Act intended for manufacturers and/or vendors to provide 
the automated detector equipment, as well as the possibility to ensure 
its functionality after the initial installation, whereas the “operation” 
and “implementation” of the system remained rightfully within the 
authority of the local government yet limited by the Department of 
Transportation’s discretion to prescribe and establish specifications 
for uniform operation of such automated systems.93  
Aside from the actual traffic-infraction detectors, namely, the 
equipment hardware itself, the continued role of the vendor and/or 
manufacturer was not necessarily contemplated or intended when the 
Act was presented before the legislature.94  Specifically, the bills pro-
                                                                                                                           
 88 Id. (emphasis added). 
 89 FLA. STAT. § 316.07456 (2010). 
 90 Id. 
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 93 Compare FLA. STAT. § 316.0083 (2010) with H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, Apr. 26, 2011, H.R. 
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 94 See generally H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, Apr. 26, 2011, H.R. 149, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011); 
H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, Apr. 13, 2010, H.R. 325, 2010 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010); H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, 
Apr. 19, 2010, H.R. 325, 2010 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010); S. BILL ANALYSIS & FISCAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT, Apr. 14, 2010, S. 2166, 2010 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010).  
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posed various provisions that referred explicitly to the governmental 
entity, not a private vendor or contractor.95  Moreover, the ordinances 
enacted based on the enabling legislation rarely, if ever, make any 
mention of a private, third-party vendor,96 even though the municipali-
ties engaging in pre-ordinance discussion, at the very least, contem-
plated the use of private companies.97 
1. Statutory Requirements For State Entities Awarding Contracts 
Based on the legislative history, the legislature acknowledged the 
existence of pilot programs used to ascertain data in order to select a 
given intersection based on statistical proof.  However, even in these 
cases, the legislative history is silent as to the vendor and/or manufac-
turer of the equipment having any role in the collection of such data, 
and certainly not in any subsequent contracts, for the continued role 
of the private entity once the pilot programs ceased.  
Nonetheless, based on the procedural safeguards set forth in stat-
utes directly regulating the contract bid process, the legislature ex-
pressly rejected the role of private contractors in the selection process 
wherein the participants have any interest in the selection of a given 
bid proposal.98  
The Orange County Pilot Project did not install the cameras to is-
sue tickets for the violations captured by the new systems, but merely 
to evaluate the effectiveness of the system and its implementation.99  
“The study objectives were to validate the severity of red-light run-
ning in Orange County, test public reaction, and quantify needed re-
sources.”100  Taken individually and collectively, these objectives are 
empty assertions for a study that, at best, could possibly provide 
evaluative value as to the prevalence of red-light violations at any 
given intersection.  Arguably, the study itself was result-driven from its 
nascence. 
After submitting its contract proposal to the county, American 
Traffic Solutions, Inc., a Scottsdale-based corporation, was awarded 
the contract in order to “design, furnish, and assist with installation 
and operation of video detection cameras at all approaches of the five 
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 96 See discussion infra Part III.B (comparing municipality interpretation of the Act and the 
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 98 FLA. STAT. § 334.193 (2010). 
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selected intersections.”101  This familiar contract language, often re-
ferred to as the “scope” of a private corporation’s red-light systems, 
appears in some form or another in almost any given contract be-
tween local government and the third-party contractors for the opera-
tion of red-light cameras.102  
The approach taken in Orange County was prior to the enact-
ment of the Traffic Safety Act, which could explain the reason for a 
“study” that did not issue tickets or even take photographs or video.  
“No video recording or snapshot photos [were] taken and no citations 
were issued.”103  
Interestingly, at the pre-Traffic Safety Act phase, ATS strategi-
cally sowed the seed for the future legislative authorization of the red-
light programs.  When the Florida Legislature finally enacted the Act, 
“Orange County selected American Traffic Solutions, Inc. (ATS) 
based in Scottsdale, Arizona to install the photo enforcement system 
since this same vendor installed cameras for the red-light running detec-
tion study.  Use of the same vendor provided a cost savings for the 
County.”104  
Essentially, the company providing the data to determine 
whether red-light programs should be enforced was the same com-
pany that would eventually operate the program whenever such sys-
tems became legal and, thus, profitable — provided that the com-
pany’s data indicated the programs should be enforced.  
Undoubtedly, the county appropriately asserts “cost savings”105 as 
its reason for granting ATS the contract to enforce the program; how-
ever, and more significantly, the county does not indicate any concern 
with the authenticity and objectivity of the study and its results.  Basi-
cally, as ATS lobbyists worked the legislators in Tallahassee, ATS con-
tractors were fervently placing themselves in all the right places for 
the “right time” to come — enactment of the Act.106 
In section 334.193 of the Florida Statutes (2010), dealing with 
transportation administration, the legislative mandate expressly pro-
hibits participation in the bidding process by certain persons with fi-
nancial interests in the purchase, sale and/or selection of contract bid 
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 103 Orange Cnty., Pilot Project Report of Nov. 2008, supra note 8.  
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 LOBBYING FIRM COMP. REP. BY PRINCIPAL, available at http://olcrpublic.leg.state.fl.us 
(Fla. 2008). 
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proposals between a governmental entity and private contractor.107  
The legislative prohibition states:  
(1) It is unlawful . . . for any company, corporation or firm in 
which . . . an employee . . . has a financial interest, to bid on, enter 
into, or to be personally interested in: (a) [t]he purchase or fur-
nishing of any materials or supplies to be used in the work of the 
state; (b) [a] contract for . . . the performance of any other work 
for which the department is responsible.108  
Based on this statutory provision, ATS is undisputedly a corpora-
tion/company/firm, notwithstanding its role in the operation of red-
light-camera programs.  In this capacity, ATS was hired to implement 
the pilot program in Orange County, prior to any legislative enact-
ment allowing issuance of citations for red-light violations.  
Initially, ATS’ role in the pilot program was to collect statistical 
data in order for the county to decide whether a red-light program 
would be appropriate within the county at any given intersection.  
Nonetheless, ATS purchased and/or furnished the equipment for the 
pilot program and, subsequently, furnished the equipment in its opera-
tion of the red light camera programs once the legislature enacted its 
usage in the issuance of citations.109  
Throughout its existence within Orange County, ATS was finan-
cially interested in the implementation and continued operation of a 
red-light camera program.  However, whereas its initial role in the 
pilot program was purportedly “objective,” insofar as its role was to 
ascertain statistical data, ATS’ subsequent role in contracting with the 
county was based on the company’s assessment that a red light camera 
program would be beneficial to the county.  
Where the lines of objectivity and substantial fiscal interests are 
intertwined as such, any private company could hardly be objective if 
the outcome of its data is dependent on its future as a potential con-
tractor with the county.  
2. Statutory Requirements For Uniform Traffic Code 
The Florida Legislature adopted Chapter 316 of the Florida Stat-
utes, commonly known as the “Uniform Traffic Code” (“Code”), for 
the legislative purpose of providing uniform application of traffic laws 
throughout the State and its counties and of traffic ordinances in its 
                                                                                                                           
 107 FLA. STAT. § 334.193 (2010) 
 108 Id. 
 109 Orange Cnty., Pilot Project Report of Nov. 2008, supra note 8.  
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municipalities.110  Notwithstanding whether the state entity is a mu-
nicipality or county, the Code includes the following proviso applica-
ble to all local governmental entities: “It is unlawful for any local au-
thority to pass or to attempt to enforce any ordinance in conflict with 
the provisions of this chapter.”111 
Contained within the Code, the legislature specifically enumer-
ated the proper scope of a municipality’s authority to control traffic in 
their respective jurisdictions.112  Among the legislative directive, section 
316.008 of the Code provides explicit parameters for the local authori-
ties’ exercise of its police powers,113 acknowledging the interrelations 
of other state entities and their respective ability to regulate traffic114 
while upholding the Code’s purpose of uniform application through-
out the entire state, regardless of jurisdiction.115  
Section 316.008(1) delegates qualified power to the local authori-
ties, wherein the Code is intended to provide the minimum statutory 
requirements necessary for uniform application of traffic laws, but not 
intended to prevent local entities from regulating streets and highways 
within their respective jurisdictions and with their reasonable exercise 
of police power.116 
Among the enumerations contained in section 316.008(1) for the 
power of local entities, the Code includes the following permissible 
exercise of local authorities: “(b) Regulating traffic by means of police 
officers or official traffic control devices. . . . (w) Regulating, restrict-
ing, or monitoring traffic by security devices or personnel on public 
streets and highways, whether by public or private parties and provid-
ing for the construction and maintenance of such streets and high-
ways.”117  
In order to maintain the Code’s purpose of uniformity, section 
316.008(8) addresses the specific guidelines for local entities operating 
automated traffic infraction detectors pursuant to the Traffic Safety 
                                                                                                                           
 110 FLA. STAT. § 316.002 (2011). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 As defined in section 316.003, the term “[l]ocal authorities,” as it appears within Chapter 
316, including the Uniform Traffic Code and the Traffic Safety Act, includes “all officers and 
public officials of the several counties and municipalities of this state.”  FLA. STAT. § 316.003(20) 
(2010). 
 114 As defined in section 316.003, the term “official traffic control devices,” as it appears 
within Chapter 316, including the Uniform Traffic Code and the Traffic Safety Act, is defined as: 
“All signs, signals, markings, and devices, not inconsistent with this chapter, placed or erected by 
authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction for the purpose of regulating, warning, 
or guiding traffic.”  FLA. STAT. § 316.003(23) (2010). 
 115 FLA. STAT. § 316.008 (2011). 
 116 FLA. STAT. § 316.008(1) (2011). 
 117 FLA. STAT. §§ 316.008(1)(b), (1)(w) (2011). 
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Act.118  This section begins with the legislature’s initial recognition that 
a county or municipality may implement the use of traffic infraction 
detectors pursuant to section 316.0083 of the Florida Statutes.119  Im-
mediately thereafter, the legislature included the following qualifica-
tions for the use of traffic-infraction detectors120: “Only a municipality 
may install or authorize the installation of such detectors” within the 
incorporated areas of the municipality, and “only a county may install 
or authorize the installation of such detectors” within the unincorpo-
rated areas of the county.121 
Undoubtedly, as the legislature acknowledged the possible role of 
private parties to construct or maintain streets and highways,122 the 
legislature also recognized the possible role of a third-party contractor 
to provide equipment and installation of red-light cameras, which in-
clude technological software and specialized technical training that 
would not otherwise be readily available to a local entity.123  This legis-
lative recognition of the need for third-party equipment and installa-
tion is contained within section 316.008, which deals specifically and 
exclusively with the exercise of local power pursuant to the Traffic 
Safety Act; section 316.008(b) provides that a county or municipality 
may “install or, by contract or interlocal agreement, authorize the in-
stallation of any such detectors” within its respective jurisdiction.124 
Notably, while the first sub-section of section 316.008 authorizes 
the local entity’s “use of traffic infraction detectors,” the second sub-
section merely provides local authorities with the means to acquire 
the detectors and ensure proper installation.125 
Based on the dual purposes of both the Traffic Safety Act and the 
Traffic Safety Code, the legislature defers to the discretion of the De-
partment of Transportation, an agency appointed with the task of up-
                                                                                                                           
 118 FLA. STAT. § 316.008(8) (2011). 
 119 FLA. STAT. § 316.008(8)(a) (2011). 
 120 In section 316.003, the term “[t]raffic infraction detector,” as it appears within Chapter 
316, including the Uniform Traffic Code and the Traffic Safety Act, is defined as  
[a] vehicle sensor installed to work in conjunction with a traffic control signal and a camera 
or cameras synchronized to automatically record two or more sequenced photographic or 
electronic images or streaming video of only the rear of a motor vehicle at the time the ve-
hicle fails to stop behind the stop bar or clearly marked stop line when facing a traffic con-
trol signal steady red light.  
FLA. STAT. § 316.003(87) (2011). 
 121 FLA. STAT. § 316.008(8)(a) (2011). 
 122 FLA. STAT. § 316.008(1)(b) (2011). 
 123 FLA. STAT. § 316.008(1)(b), (8)(b) (2011). 
 124 FLA. STAT. § 316.008(8)(a)-(c) (2011). 
 125 Compare FLA. STAT. § 316.008(a), with FLA. STAT. § 316.008(b). 
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holding the guidelines of the Code and ensuring statewide uniformity 
in traffic regulation.126  
In conjunction with the legislature’s intention to confer to local 
authorities the power to utilize traffic infraction detectors, the Traffic 
Safety Act’s legislative history reflects the legislature’s concern with 
the possibility that local authorities may invoke the Act and, conse-
quently, frustrate the Code’s purpose of ensuring statewide uniform-
ity.127  Within a staff report providing substantive analysis of traffic con-
trol devices that are installed and operated by the state and local gov-
ernments, the legislature acknowledged that “all public bodies or offi-
cials that purchase and install traffic control devices in Florida must 
ensure that such devices conform to the manual and specifications of 
the [Department of Transportation].”128  
Accordingly, the Code requires the municipality or county to 
erect appropriate signage to inform drivers approaching an intersec-
tion equipped with a traffic infraction detector.129  The signage must be 
in compliance with the requirements of Florida Department of Trans-
portation.130  Specifically, this requirement was imposed upon the mu-
nicipality and/or county according to their role within the meaning of 
the Act, wherein the local entity could elect to utilize traffic infraction 
detectors but, in so doing, would also be required to take measures to 
ensure the uniformity and consistency throughout the state.131 
Based on the legislative history, the Act cannot be construed as 
having been intended to include the role of red light camera vendors 
and/or manufacturers in erecting the appropriate signage.  
Although, standing alone, the signage provisions of various 
agreements between the private contractors and a given county or 
municipality are not necessarily unlawful, these provisions should be 
taken within the contexts of the entire contracts.  In the aggregate, 
these contracts ultimately open the door for the municipality to dele-
gate all its responsibilities to one private contractor in one contract, 
                                                                                                                           
 126 In section 316.003, the term “department,” as it appears within Chapter 316, including 
the Uniform Traffic Code and the Traffic Safety Act, is defined as “[t]he Department of Highway 
Safety and Motor Vehicles . . .  Any reference [within this chapter] to Department of Transporta-
tion shall be construed as referring to the Department of Transportation . . .  or the appropriate 
division thereof.”  FLA. STAT. § 316.003(8) (2011). 
 127 See, e.g.,H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, April 26, 2011, H.R. 149, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011). 
 128 Id. 
 129 FLA. STAT. § 316.0776(2)(a) (2010) (“If the department, county, or municipality installs a 
traffic infraction detector at an intersection, the department, county, or municipality shall notify 
the public that a traffic infraction device may be in use at that intersection . . . .  Such signage 
used to notify the public must meet the specifications for uniform signals and devices adopted by 
the Department of Transportation . . . .”). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
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ultimately allocating all governmental duties of a legislative scheme 
that was intended to remain within the authority of the local govern-
ment — not of a private company.  
The procedures for issuance and processing of citations enumer-
ated in the Act provide specific directives addressed to the municipali-
ties and/or counties.132  Section 318.0083(1)(a) of the Act allows the 
department, a county, or a municipality to “authorize a traffic infrac-
tion enforcement officer . . . to issue a traffic citation” for one’s failure 
to stop at a red light.133  This provision reflects the traditional enforce-
ment of traffic infractions by an officer’s personal issuance of a cita-
tion.134  
Subsequently, the legislature included the following provision in 
order to incorporate the newly-implemented automated infraction 
detectors with the traditional traffic enforcement procedure: notwith-
standing the authorization for a traffic enforcement officer to issue a 
citation, local authorities may authorize “review of information from a 
traffic infraction detector by an authorized employee or agent of the 
department, a county, or a municipality before issuance of the traffic 
citation by the traffic infraction enforcement officer.”135  
Prior to the Act’s final enactment, the bills presented to the legis-
lature made a distinction between the traffic-infraction detector and 
the traffic infraction enforcement officer, wherein the detector is a 
machine that produces data that is read by a person, namely, the offi-
cer, who is authorized to review and/or issue notice violations.136  To-
gether, the report of an officer and the data collected by the detectors 
would be akin to the presence of the officer during the violation.  
However, the legislature had no reason to believe this was a “tiered” 
process like the one created by the agreements between the munici-
palities and the private contractors, although such process has recently 
been judicially recognized in a few cases.137   
                                                                                                                           
 132 FLA. STAT. § 316.0083(1)(a) (2010). 
 133 Id. 
 134 See Letter from Charlie Crist, supra note 7. 
 135 FLA. STAT. § 316.0083(1)(a) (2010). 
 136 Compare FLA. STAT. § 316.0083 (2010), with H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, Apr. 26, 2011, H.R. 
149, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011); H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, Apr. 13, 2010, H.R. 325, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010); 
H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, Apr.. 19, 2010, H.R. 325, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010); and S. BILL ANALYSIS & 
FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, Apr. 14, 2010, S.B. 2166, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010).   
 137 Id.  See, e.g., Williams v. Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-400, 2008 WL 782540, at *2 
(E.D. Tenn. 2008) (“Redflex employees review the images taken from the camera or images 
demonstrating that a particular motor vehicle ran a red light.  If the license tag number is visible, 
then the Redflex employee provides an image of the violation which demonstrates the violation 
and clearly shows the license number of the vehicle.  Still photos taken from the video showing 
the violation are sent to the Knoxville Police Department where an officer views the snapshot(s) 
and sends the citation to the registered owner of the vehicle.  Under the Program, the fine can be 
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B. Municipality Ordinances Based On Broad Interpretation of the 
Act 
The Traffic Safety Act was intended to enable local authorities to 
utilize automated traffic infraction detectors as alternative mecha-
nisms for enforcing red-light running violations and promoting traffic 
safety.138  Subsequent to enactment of the enabling legislation, local 
authorities statewide enacted ordinances in order to adopt the use of 
red-light camera systems.139  
Prior to the Act’s enactment, the City of Pembroke Pines re-
quested an opinion from the Attorney General as to whether the city 
could utilize unmanned cameras to record, but not necessarily enforce, 
red light violations.140  The Attorney General opined that, based on 
sections 316.002 and 316.008 of the Florida Statutes, the City of Pem-
broke Pines had the authority to enact an ordinance allowing the use 
of automated infraction detectors in order to monitor red-light viola-
tions and record the license plate number of the car violating the traf-
fic signal.141 
Based on the Attorney General’s opinion, even if the City had 
the power to monitor traffic by utilizing traffic infraction detectors, a 
court must still abide by judicial precedent in order to ascertain the 
scope of authority delegated in an enabling act.142  Therefore, the At-
torney General acknowledged the role of the court upon judicial re-
view: “It is a rule of statutory construction that an express power duly 
conferred may include the implied authority to use the means neces-
sary to make the express power effective, although such implied au-
thority may not warrant the exercise of a substantive power not con-
ferred.”143 
In order to uphold uniformity through the State Uniform Traffic 
Code, the legislature attempted to define the scope of permissible ac-
tions in the context of local authorities utilizing automated traffic-
infraction detectors.144  Section 316.0776 of the Florida Statutes pro-
                                                                                                                           
paid by mail to Redflex.”); Agomo v. Fenty, 916 A.2d 181, 189 (D.C. 2007) (“Where an image is 
recorded by system cameras — and unless the image is indecipherable (e.g., no clear image of 
the license plate) or patently unusable (e.g., in speeding photos, more than one vehicle in the 
‘detection area’) — a ‘draft’ [ticket] is prepared by ACS personnel for review by an MPD [Met-
ropolitan Police Department] officer.”).  
 138 See FLA. STAT. § 316.0083 (2012). 
 139 See infra note 148. 
 140 See Letter from Charlie Crist, supra note 7. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. (citing Molwin Inv. Co. v. Turner, 167 So. 33 (Fla. 1936)). 
 144 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 316.0776 (2010). 
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vides specific requirements if “the department, county, or municipal-
ity” exercises the authority conferred to it by the Act.145  
The language contained within this provision of the Uniform 
Code further reflects the legislative intent to require accountability by 
the local entity implementing the use of red-light cameras: “if the de-
partment, county, or municipality installs a traffic infraction detector 
at an intersection, the department, county, or municipality shall notify 
the public that a traffic device may be in use.”146  Furthermore, if the 
local entity “begins a traffic infraction detector program in a county or 
municipality that has never conducted such a program, the respective 
department, county, or municipality shall also make a public an-
nouncement and conduct a public awareness campaign of the pro-
posed use of traffic infraction detectors.”147 
However, the purpose of uniformity in statewide traffic enforce-
ment is substantially aggravated by the Act’s broadly-defined adop-
tion of automated traffic infraction detectors.   Based on the Act’s 
vaguely permissive language, these “traffic safety” ordinances reflect 
the broadly-construed scope of implementing automated traffic detec-
tors and enforcing photo-captured violations thereafter.148  Further-
more, the markedly varied degree and extent of the traffic safety ordi-
nances reflects the inconsistency of the municipalities’ interpretation 
of the Act.149 
The Act enables “local departments, municipalities, and agencies” 
to implement automated traffic infraction detectors.150  Some of the 
subsequent ordinances enacted by these “local departments, munici-
palities, and agencies” delegate the task of implementing the auto-
mated traffic systems to a specific entity or individual within its juris-
diction.151  However, other ordinances expressly adopt language similar 
                                                                                                                           
 145 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 316.0776(2)(a) (2010). 
 146 Id. 
 147 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 316.0776(2)(b) (2010). 
 148 Compare MIAMI GARDENS, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 24-21 (2011), with 
HOMESTEAD, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 18-6 (2012); SUNRISE, FLA., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES § 14-74 (2012); AVENTURA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 48-26 (2012), and 
COLLIER CNTY., FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 78-54 (2012).  
 149 Id.  
 150 See supra note 145.  
 151 COLLIER CNTY., FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 78-54 (2012) (“The County Manager is 
authorized to implement the provisions and requirements of the Mark Wandall Traffic Safety 
Act . . . within this jurisdiction in coordination with the Sheriff.”); TALLAHASSEE, FLA., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES § 20-50(a) (2012) (“The city manager or his/her designee is authorized to imple-
ment a system utilizing traffic infraction detectors pursuant to F.S. § 316.0083.”) (emphasis 
added); MIAMI-DADE CNTY., FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 30-422(3) (2012) (“The Mayor or 
designee is authorized to implement the provisions and requirements of the Act . . . .”) (emphasis 
added); GAINESVILLE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 5-12 (2012) (“The city manager, or his/her 
designee, is authorized to implement a system utilizing traffic infraction detectors pursuant to the 
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to the Act, reflecting a broad delegation to the entire local entity, 
rather than the specific entity that will, in actuality, undertake the task 
delegated.152 
Although a rarity by comparison to the statewide majority, a few 
ordinances expressly acknowledge the possibility for contracts with 
private companies as a source of utilizing the municipality’s authority 
to use automated traffic detectors.153  The City of Margate’s ordinance 
is arguably the most transparent and narrowly-tailored acknowledg-
ment of third-party involvement: “The city manager is authorized to 
implement the provisions and requirements of [the Act], including but 
not limited to, proposing the use of outside vendors to city commis-
sioners to assist the city with implementing the installation and logis-
tics of the use of traffic infraction detectors.”154  Albeit a much weaker 
acknowledgement, Manatee County’s ordinance recognizes the use of 
a third party authorized to collect the penalties imposed by the ordi-
nance.155  
Notwithstanding these anomalous examples, the majority of ordi-
nances remain silent regarding the use of private, third-party compa-
nies to implement and operate automated traffic detectors.  The ma-
jority of municipalities enacting these ordinances, however, currently 
contract with a few private companies, usually located outside the 
state of Florida, to install, monitor, and operate automated systems.  
Nonetheless, even when the resolutions for such contracts were 
submitted for approval, city authorities often eluded any explicit dis-
cussion over the contractual relationship created between the city and 
the private company.156  Strikingly, even in the instance of public dis-
                                                                                                                           
provisions and requirements of F.S. § 316.0083 . . . .”) (emphasis added); ESCAMBIA CNTY., FLA., 
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 94-183(b) (2012) (“Escambia County, through the county administra-
tor, or his or her designee, is authorized to install and utilize traffic infraction detectors . . . ”) 
(emphasis added). 
 152 AVENTURA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 48-41 (2012); SUNRISE, FLA., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES § 14-74 (2012) (“The city may utilize traffic infraction detectors as an ancillary 
deterrent to traffic control signal violations . . . .”); HOMESTEAD, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 
18-21 (2012) (“When the city installs a traffic infraction detector at an intersection, it shall erect 
signage at the intersection . . . .”); WEST PALM BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §  86-200 
(2012) (“The city exercises its option under F.S. § 316.008, to use traffic infraction detectors 
within its jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 153 See discussion infra Part III.B.  
 154 MARGATE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17-73.1 (2011). 
 155 MANATEE CNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-22-74 (2011) (“[T]he county adminis-
trator may either through staff or third party vendors employ such collection efforts . . . .”) (em-
phasis added). 
 156 See, e.g., Reg. Meeting Minutes R-10-0387 at 69-70 Dep’t Of Capital Improvements 
Program, City of Miami City Comm’n (Sept. 16, 2010), available at http://egov.ci.miami.fl.us/ 
meetings/2010/9/2093_M_City_Commission_10-09-16_Verbatim_Minutes_(Long).pdf.  (“The critical 
step in the process is that once a potential violation is identified, the information is electronically 
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sent over such contracts, local authorities dodged the issue of contract-
ing away its authority to a private company, dismissing the public con-
cern without even acknowledging the potentially damaging implica-
tions.157 
C. Contracts Between Municipalities and Companies Providing 
Red-Light Cameras 
Based on local entities’ broad interpretation of the Traffic Safety 
Act and subsequently-enacted ordinances, the majority of legislation 
pertaining to the automated traffic-infraction detectors remains silent 
on the employment of a private, third-party company located outside 
the state.  However, most municipalities expressly confer to private 
companies the authority to implement and utilize the automated sys-
tems—the authority that the legislature expressly conferred to the 
local entities themselves.  
In February 2011, the City of Deland entered an agreement with 
Sensys America, Inc., an agreement that strayed from the predomi-
nance of ATS in the statewide trend towards privatization of red-light-
camera programs.158  Nevertheless, similar to the majority of agree-
ments between private contractors and the local governmental en-
                                                                                                                           
forwarded to the City where a traffic infraction enforcement officer views the footage and gives 
that final authorization for – of a violation to be issued.”). 
 157 In a city commission meeting on September 16, 2010, a resolution was proposed to ap-
prove an agreement between the City of Miami and American Traffic Solutions, wherein the 
company would “furnish, install, operate and maintain a traffic infraction detector program.”  See 
id.  When the city commission opened the floor for public discussion, a Miami resident expressed 
his concern, albeit somewhat inarticulately, about the contract resolution: “But listen, going to be 
a problem because ATS is a private entity.  It’s not a government function.  It’s not government.”  
Subsequently, the speaker began a somewhat rambling discussion, citing the common law, the 
Constitution, and the American Civil Liberties Union.  At some point, a commissioner inter-
rupted the man’s oration and dismissively responded, “Thank you.”  An exchange of unintelligi-
ble words ensued between the two individuals, wherein the commissioner demanded that the 
man “quote . . . the amendment for equal protection,” and the man relentlessly emphasized, 
“ATS is not a government agency.”  Ultimately, since the man could not explicitly cite legal doc-
trine, the commissioner dismissed the man altogether, without any discussion of his underlying, 
and arguably meritorious, argument against the role of ATS in the operation of the traffic infrac-
tion program.  Id. 
 158 Initially, the City of Deland selected LaserCraft, Inc. for the implementation of the Red 
Light Program, but before any installations, a class action suit was filed in the State of Florida 
challenging the legality of the program.  When the litigation was settled and the Act was finally 
enacted throughout Florida, LaserCraft was purchased by ATS.  However, since ATS was not the 
vendor initially selected for the contract, the city once again issued a request for bid proposal.  
This time around, the city selected Sensys America, Inc.  See Request for Comm’n Action from 
William Ridgway, Finance Dep’t Head, to City Mgr., City of Deland, Fla.,  (Feb. 7, 2011) (on file 
with author).  
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tity,159 the agreement included a provision in which Sensys was re-
quired to perform an “initial review” in preparing and processing the 
citation recorded by the traffic infraction detector.160  
The provision, entitled “Citation Preparation and Processing Ser-
vices,” defined the company’s role subsequent to the detection of a 
traffic infraction by the company’s equipment: “Sensys shall perform 
initial review of all data generated at the roadside, process and format 
violations utilizing a computerized traffic citation program . . . and 
transfer the citations to the Police Department’s computer for review 
and decision on whether or not to issue a citation.”161 
This additional tier in the processing of a citation once a traffic 
infraction detector has already recorded the data is precisely where 
the legal issue lies.  The legislature may have contemplated the im-
plementation of red-light-camera programs, which would entail utiliz-
ing a traffic infraction detector supplied by a private company.  How-
ever, beyond the actual hardware of the equipment, the legislature 
never addressed or even acknowledged the role of a private company 
in initially reviewing the data prior to the statutory review by a traffic 
infraction enforcement officer.162  
Nonetheless, even if the initial review could be performed by a 
person other than a duly sworn officer, such as a “specifically-trained 
technician,”163 the legislative history addressed this initial review with-
out any indication that this tier could be performed by any person 
outside the state of Florida: “Traffic infraction enforcement officers . . . 
must be physically located in the county or adjacent county in which 
infractions he or she enforces occur, or in the jurisdiction of the circuit 
court where the violation occurred . . . .”164 
Although such a restrictive mandate ultimately died on the Sen-
ate floor prior to enactment of the Act, this provision indicates the 
                                                                                                                           
 159 “Infraction Processing . . .  The Vendor shall make the initial determination that the 
image meets the requirements of the Ordinance and this Agreement, and is otherwise sufficient 
to enable the City to meets [sic] its burden of demonstrating a violation of the Ordinance.  If the 
Vendor determines that the standards are not met, the image shall not be processed any further.”  
Agreement Between the City of Aventura and Am. Traffic Solutions for Traffic Safety Camera 
Program (February 8, 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Agreement Between the City of 
Aventura and Am. Traffic Solutions]. 
 160 See Request for Comm’n Action from William Ridgway, Finance Dep’t Head, to City 
Mgr., City of Deland, Fla. (Feb. 7, 2011) (on file with author). 
 161 Id. (emphasis added). 
 162 Compare FLA. STAT. § 316.0083 (2010), with H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, April 26, 2011, H.R. 
149, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011); H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, April 13, 2010, H.R. 325, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010); 
H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, March 9, 2010, H.R. 325, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010), and S. BILL ANALYSIS 
&FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, April 21, 2010, S. 2166, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010). 
 163 See, e.g., H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS, April 13, 2010, H.R. 325, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010). 
 164 S. BILL ANALYSIS & FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, Apr. 21, 2010, S.B. 2166, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 
2010).   
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locality was intended for the processing and issuance of citations for 
violations recorded by the traffic infraction detectors.165  Furthermore, 
based on this provision within the context of its legislative history, the 
legislature may have intended to hone in on the locality, but neither 
acknowledged nor addressed the notion of an initial review by anyone 
other than an officer or technician within the state.  
In theory, the legislature opted not to restrict the municipality by 
requiring a duly sworn officer within the jurisdiction where the infrac-
tion took place, yet did not necessarily intend for this silence to be 
construed broadly as to allow a third-party, private contractor, located 
outside the state, to act as a “filter” for the initial review of data re-
corded using traffic infraction detectors.  
IV. DOCTRINAL LIMITATIONS FOR CONTRACTS BETWEEN LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE ENTITIES 
In light of the legislative history leading up to the enactment of 
the Traffic Safety Act and the subsequent ordinances enacted locally 
therefrom, the question is whether the current policies of state and 
local authorities, and their ongoing contractual relationships with the 
private companies providing “traffic infraction systems or programs,” 
including not only the equipment but also the operation, maintenance, 
review, and issuance of citations, comports with the laws limiting scope 
of municipality power in order to safeguard against unfair business 
practice and covert collusion.   
A. Ultra Vires Doctrine 
As a means of providing accountability for municipalities’ exer-
cise of authority, courts have invoked the ultra vires doctrine, the 
“long established principle that a municipality cannot contract away 
the exercise of its police powers.”166  Based on this doctrine, a munici-
pality may not enter into a contract that ultimately transfers to a pri-
vate entity or individual the municipality’s executive authority.167 
In Morgran Co., Inc. v. Orange Cnty., Morgran entered into an 
agreement with Orange County, executed by a county chairman, “on 
behalf of the Board of County Commissioners.”168  Based on this 
agreement, the county was obligated to “support and expeditiously 
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process” Morgran’s re-zoning application in exchange for a 50-acre 
donation to the county for use as a park once the County fulfilled its 
promise to “expeditiously support” Morgran’s application.169  
After Morgran submitted the re-zoning application, the county 
rejected the re-zoning requests set forth therein and ultimately denied 
Morgran’s application.170  Soon thereafter, Morgran filed suit against 
the county for a breach of its agreement to support his application in 
exchange for his donation of land for use as county property.171 
Morgran’s argument attempted to distinguish between “an obli-
gation to support the request for rezoning and an obligation to ap-
prove the request.”172  In an attempt to defend the contract between 
the county and the private contractor, Morgran argued that both con-
tracting parties, well aware of the laws governing contract zoning, con-
structed “carefully worded, highly negotiated contract language that 
‘[did] not purport, either impliedly or expressly, to restrict or any way 
interfere with, the exercise of the Board of Commissioner’s police 
power as the final zoning authority in the County.’”
 173 
The court rejected Morgran’s argument, statinding: “[t]his argu-
ment, we fear, draws too fine a distinction. . . .  In Chung, in rejecting a 
similar argument, the court noted that any hearings regarding the is-
sue of rezoning would ‘be a pro forma exercise since the County has 
already obligated itself to a decision.’”174  Accordingly, the court found 
that the agreement between Morgran and the County was “unambi-
guously void as a matter of law, since . . . [it] requires the County to 
contract away its police powers.”175 
In P.C.B. P’ship v. City of Largo, the city entered into an agree-
ment that purportedly restricted the city’s authority in deciding 
whether to a build a road, install a traffic device, and/or permit the 
construction of a parking lot and storm drainage.176  In order to decide 
whether the agreement between the city and the private entity was a 
valid contract, the court found that “[t]he City [did] . . . not have the 
authority to enter into such a contract, which effectively contract[ed] 
away the exercise of its police powers.”177 
                                                                                                                           
 169 Id. at 641. 
 170 Id. at 642. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. at 643. 
 173 Id. 
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In so finding, the court invoked the ultra vires doctrine, which es-
sentially invalidates a contract where a municipality does not have the 
power to delegate its authority to a third-party, private contractor.178  
Basically, the rationale underlying the ultra vires doctrine is that if an 
ordinance delegates to municipal officials an arbitrary discretion, 
without providing definitive rules to guide the exercise of this dele-
gated authority, the ordinance cannot be enforced.179 
In County of Volusia v. City of Deltona, the court similarly in-
voked the ultra vires doctrine in order to invalidate an agreement be-
tween the city and a private agency, where the city’s ordinance did not 
contain “objective guidelines and standards for its enforcement . . . nor 
[could] such be reasonably inferred from the language of the ordi-
nance.”180  The court ruled that “an agreement effectively contracting 
away a city’s exercise of its police power is unenforceable.”181 
The invalidating proposition underlying the ultra vires doctrine is 
foundationally based on the general principle that “[u]nrestricted dis-
cretion in the application of a law without appropriate guidelines and 
determining its meaning may not be delegated by the City Council to 
an agency or to one person.”182 
B. Contracts Based on Ordinances 
Although a contract itself may be invalidated based on its unlaw-
ful delegation of unbridled discretion to a third-party entity, a substan-
tially more complex legal issue arises where the contract is based on a 
municipal ordinance.  Accordingly, where a municipality enters into an 
agreement based on a municipal ordinance, the issue becomes 
whether the ordinance itself also violates the legislative delegation of 
authority conferred through an enabling statute.  
Generally, courts exercise a substantial degree of legislative def-
erence, wherein an ordinance is presumptively within the authority 
and discretion of its enacting municipality.183  The general principle is 
that a municipal ordinance is inferior to the statute and, thus, cannot 
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conflict with any controlling provision of that statute.184  However, 
upon judicial review, a court should “indulge every reasonable pre-
sumption in favor of an ordinance’s constitutionality.”185 
Therefore, in order for an ordinance to be legislatively pre-
empted, the state law and the local ordinance must “contradict each 
other in the sense that both . . . cannot co-exist.”186  In order to ascer-
tain the validity of the ordinance, the question before the court is: 
“does compliance with the ordinance violate the state law, or make 
compliance with state law impossible?  It is not a conflict if the ordi-
nance is more stringent than the statute.”187  
However, where the issue before the court is based on an ordi-
nance in furtherance of the municipality’s police power to promote 
traffic safety, the legislature explicitly defined the interrelationship 
between the requirements of the Uniform Traffic Code and the exer-
cise of police power by local authorities: the Code’s purpose of pro-
moting statewide uniformity in traffic regulation cannot prevent local 
authorities from “[r]egulating or prohibiting stopping, standing, or 
parking. . . . Restricting the use of streets . . . [or] [r]egulating, restrict-
ing, or monitoring traffic by security devices or personnel . . . whether 
by public or private parties,” applying to all streets and highways un-
der the municipality’s jurisdiction and “within the reasonable exercise 
of the police power.”188 
Nonetheless, courts have recognized that modernized govern-
ment includes the increased use of technological advancement and, 
accordingly, the need for flexible, loosely drawn standards in regulat-
ing legislative enactments under the state’s police power.189  This rec-
ognition of the need for flexible rules so as not to restrict adapting to 
changing circumstances has been a longstanding proposition, espe-
cially in the context of traffic safety: “public streets have never been 
used by any vehicles that are as dangerous to the public as the auto-
mobile, and the power inherent in every municipality to protect life 
and insure public safety will support all reasonable ordinances, rules 
and regulations adopted by the proper authority for such purpose.”190 
In recognizing the need for legislation to adapt to technological 
advancements and modernizations of governmental functions, a court 
will nevertheless remain steadfast in the notion that, when a statute’s 
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delegation of power does not also provide adequate safeguards 
against “unfairness or favoritism,” and when an available safeguard 
could have easily been provided, the legislation cannot be upheld.191  
The Florida Supreme Court explained, “[i]n other words, the legisla-
tive exercise of the police power should be so clearly defined, so lim-
ited in scope, that nothing is left to the unbridled discretion or whim 
of the administrative agency charged with the responsibility of enforc-
ing the act.” 192 
Nonetheless, even if the ordinance could be classified as an exer-
cise of local authority to promote health, welfare, safety and/or moral-
ity, “it is still necessary that the exactions be fixed in the ordinance 
with such certainty that the granting and denial . . . could not be left to 
the whim of a private [entity] . . . or the administrative agency.”193  The 
general proposition underlying the requirement that ordinances be 
clearly and narrowly drawn is that a municipality cannot delegate its 
function to legislate – that is, to exercise discretion as to the content of 
the law.  Local authorities may make a law and incorporate therein a 
condition precedent upon which execution may depend, but it cannot 
be made to depend on the unbridled discretion of a single individual.194 
In order to prescribe the permissible scope of an ordinance, 
courts have compared three interrelated factors: 1) the enacting legis-
lation; 2) the authority conferred to the local entity; and 3) the effect 
of the local entity’s exercise of this authority through an ordinance.195  
Based on this three-prong comparison, a valid ordinance “must 
prescribe definite rules and conditions which . . . shall [be met] and 
may not leave the determination . . . to the undirected and uncon-
trolled discretion of even the . . . [local] authority.”196  Conversely, 
where an ordinance does not set forth any criteria for making deter-
minations other than simply identifying a general prerequisite, the 
burden of determining who falls within the ordinance “involve[s] legal 
questions too intricate to impose as a condition precedent” on a third-
party entity.197  
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V. ANALYSIS  
A. Problematic Operation Of Contracts Between Municipalities 
And Private Companies 
In a practical and most basic sense, the vast majority of contracts 
between municipalities and private companies for the installing, fur-
nishing, maintaining, and operating of automated traffic infraction 
detectors necessarily involves the following sequence of events, com-
monly referred to as the “traffic-infraction-detector program”:198  
1) Scott’s car travels through an intersection after the light has 
turned red;  
2) If his car exceeds a specific speed at a specific time after the 
light turned red, Scott’s car will trigger two sensors, one at the moment 
his car crosses the line into the intersection, and one at some point 
further in the intersection;199  
3) These sensors will instantaneously emit a signal to cameras 
perched up on poles and situated in such a way that a picture and/or 
video can capture the entire intersection and, at the same time, cap-
ture Scott’s car passing through the intersection and his license plate 
number;200  
4) These images are then transmitted online to company techni-
cians, usually located outside the state, who initially review the images 
of Scott’s car;201  
5) Upon review, if the technician concludes that Scott’s car did 
pass through the intersection after the traffic signal turned red, the 
technician will access an online database provided by Florida’s De-
partment of Motor Vehicles, enter in the license plate number, and 
record Scott’s information, including his mailing address, for subse-
quent issuance of the citation;202  
6) Once the technician has input Scott’s information into an elec-
tronic citation template prepared by the company, the citation, includ-
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ing images of Scott’s car, will then be transmitted to the State for ap-
proval by a law enforcement officer;203  
7) Upon approval, the law enforcement officer’s electronic signa-
ture will be superimposed on the electronic citation template;204  
8) The company or the officer will print and mail the citation; and 
finally,  
9) Within a few days, Scott will be issued his “notice of a viola-
tion.” 
In terms of logistics for the automated system’s process, the com-
pany provides the following services based on its contract with a mu-
nicipality: furnishing the equipment; installing the device — which, in 
some cases, includes the company receiving an easement for placing 
camera posts on private property — at or near the intersection; con-
ducting training programs for law enforcement and city employees 
using the company’s software, and for judicial officers specially 
trained for appeal purposes to testify in favor of the company’s sys-
tem;  maintaining the camera by providing periodic audits; providing 
and ensuring the security of the electronic database software transmit-
ting information from the camera to the company and law enforce-
ment; monitoring and initially reviewing images to identify an actual 
violation; accessing the Department of Motor Vehicle database to 
identify owners’ information; transmitting and providing the citation 
template for law enforcement review; and ultimately, issuing citations 
and/or collecting fines therefrom.205  
By contrast, the municipality’s contractual obligations with the 
company require the municipality to take the following actions: pro-
vide the company access to traffic signals, including access to the de-
vices’ timing and synchronization; designate specific city employees to 
aid the company’s performance of the automated systems, including 
the company’s mandatory training programs for law enforcement and 
judicial officers; facilitate the process for acquiring an easement of 
                                                                                                                           
 203 See, e.g., Williams v. Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-400, 2008 WL 782540, at *2 
(E.D. Tenn. 2008) (“Redflex employees review the images taken from the camera or images 
demonstrating that a particular motor vehicle ran a red light.  If the license tag number is visible, 
then the Redflex employee provides an image of the violation which demonstrates the violation 
and clearly shows the license number of the vehicle.  Still photos taken from the video showing 
the violation are sent to the Knoxville Police Department where an officer views the snapshot(s) 
and sends the citation to the registered owner of the vehicle.  Under the Program, the fine can be 
paid by mail to Redflex.”); Agomo v. Fenty, 916 A.2d 181, 189 (D.C. 2007) (“Where an image is 
recorded by system cameras—and unless the image is indecipherable (e.g. no clear image of the 
license plate) or patently unusable (e.g. in speeding photos, more than one vehicle in the ‘detec-
tion area’)—a ‘draft’ [ticket] is prepared by ACS personnel for review by an MPD [Metropolitan 
Police Department] officer.”). 
 204 See sources cited supra note 203. 
 205 See sources cited supra note 203. 
174 FIU Law Review [8:137 
private property for the company’s use; enable the company’s access 
to protected driver information; conduct periodic audits of the com-
pany’s system — so long as the company is given prior notice of the 
audit; and any other collateral resources necessary for the company’s 
operation of the system.206  
In most instances, the contracts between local authorities and pri-
vate companies providing such services expressly delegate almost en-
tirely the scope of the municipalities’ police powers.  Interestingly, 
most of these contracts include the transfer of obligations to the pri-
vate companies through provisions containing language mirroring, 
almost identically, to the statutory language relating to the municipali-
ties’ exercise of permissible police power.207  
Arguably, such agreements between a municipality and a private 
company essentially contract away the municipality’s police powers in 
the context of traffic regulation and enforcement.  Not only does the 
company obtain access to public resources that would normally be 
provided to the municipality and its exercise of traffic enforcement, 
but the company also obtains the authority to train city employees to 
adapt to the company’s procedures for enforcement.  
Nevertheless, the most significant indication of the municipality 
contracting away its police powers is the company’s procedure for 
initially reviewing images captured by its system prior to review by 
law enforcement and the subsequent transmission of only those im-
ages that the company employee deemed as proof of the violation.  
Not only is the company employee usually working outside the state 
and not a sworn law enforcement officer, but he is also exercising his 
own personal discretion in whether the images captured should be 
transmitted to law enforcement for approval.  Accordingly, the initial 
review conducted by company employees is the sole determining fac-
tor in whether a citation will be issued, for even if law enforcement 
retains the right to review the images, such review is subsequent to the 
company employee’s initial determination that a violation occurred.  
Ultimately, the determination of whether a violation has occurred 
and a subsequent citation should be issued is left to the discretion of a 
private, non-state actor, who, in most cases, has never even set foot — 
or tire — on the state roads he monitors, and has never been trained 
on the law he enforces.  
                                                                                                                           
 206 See, e.g., Agreement Between the City of Aventura and Am. Traffic Solutions, supra note 
159.  
 207 See, e.g., Memorandum from Louis Moore, supra note 8; City of Miami, Am. Traffic 
Solutions Contract, supra note 8; Orange Cnty., Pilot Project Report of Nov. 2008, supra note 8. 
2012] Police Powers for Sale 175 
B. Potential Challenges To Ordinances Utilizing Automated Traffic 
Systems 
Because the majority of such ordinances are silent as to the role 
of a private company in terms of the post-enactment ordinances, the 
potential challenges of these ordinances seem highly unlikely to carry 
the day.  However, in at least three instances, the municipalities’ ordi-
nances may raise some questions of legality.208 
1. City Employee’s Sole Discretion To Appoint “Designee” 
The most prevalent form of potentially invalid ordinances arises 
when the municipality names a specific city employee to implement 
the systems but also includes an alternative “designee,” wherein the 
named employee has the discretion to delegate his own authority to 
“his or her designee.”209  This problematic language does not generally 
contain any degree of specificity or guidelines as to whom the named 
employee may appoint as “his or her designee.”210  
Arguably, because the ordinances do not provide any specific cri-
teria or minimum requirements for an appointed designee, the mu-
nicipality intended this language to permit for the use of a private, 
third-party company to act as the “designee.”211  The issue here is not 
only the broad discretion conferred to an individual city employee to 
delegate away his own authority to implement the entire automated 
systems, but also the lack of specificity in terms of permissible desig-
nees based on explicit criteria to provide guidance and to limit the city 
employee’s discretion to appoint a designee.212  Essentially, as these 
ordinances stand now, a city employee may choose from a limitless 
pool of potential designees, regardless of whether these designees are 
state actors or private agents exercising the municipality’s power to 
implement, operate, and maintain automated traffic systems.  
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2. Express Deviations From Standard Practices of Uniform Traffic 
Code 
The second instance of potentially problematic ordinances arises 
in the rare instances in which the municipality expressly deviates from 
the standard operations of the Uniform Traffic Code.  The City of 
Dunnellon enacted an ordinance allowing the city to “utilize image 
capture technologies as a supplemental means of monitoring compli-
ance with laws related to traffic control signals . . . .”213  Although the 
initial provisions do not reflect any deviation from the common prac-
tice of municipalities implementing automated systems, a subsequent 
provision of the ordinance requires notices of photo-captured viola-
tions be “addressed using the city’s own special magistrates and not 
through the uniform traffic citations or county courts.”214 
Nonetheless, in a collateral ordinance pertaining to the appropri-
ate signage providing notice of the use of automated traffic systems, 
the city expressly excuses violations of the Uniform Traffic Code’s 
signage requirement, insofar as the ordinance includes the following 
provision: “Failure to erect, maintain or create these signs shall not 
invalidate or impair any enforcement of [the automated traffic detec-
tors].”215 
Strikingly, the ordinance does not address the specific purpose for 
an alternative method of issuing citations based on its explicit dis-
missal of the state’s uniform traffic citations.216  Such explicit deviations 
from the common operations of traffic regulation are particularly 
troublesome because the Code’s purpose is to promote statewide uni-
formity of traffic enforcement and procedures therefrom.  The Dun-
nellon ordinance is particularly anomalous based on its express devia-
tion from the common operation of the Uniform Traffic Code, includ-
ing the Code’s provisions on the issuance of uniform traffic citations 
and the required signage.217  
Even more questionable, the ordinance deviates substantially 
from the traditional practices of judicial proceedings relating to 
photo-captured violations.  Insofar as the operation of the city’s own 
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“special magistrates,” a collateral provision of the city’s automated 
traffic program explicitly renders the “formal rules of evidence” inap-
plicable.218  Alternatively, the ordinance provides a specific standard 
for special magistrate’s discretion in allowing or disallowing specific 
evidence, wherein “all evidence of a type commonly relied upon by 
reasonable prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs shall be 
admissible” and “any part of the evidence may be received in written 
form.”219 
Such a flagrant dismissal of the traditional rules of evidence pre-
sents the issue of whether alleged violators captured by automated 
detectors within Dunnellon’s jurisdiction are provided adequate proc-
ess based on the requirements of the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses.  
In the context of due process, a deviation from formal rules of 
evidence necessarily entails a deviation from the purposes and goals 
of such rules, including the appropriate procedure required to protect 
the individual’s right to due process.  
In terms of equal protection, because the photo-captured viola-
tions issued by Dunnellon’s automated system do not require the pro-
cedural safeguards of formal rules of evidence, the alleged violators 
may be similarly situated as alleged violators in other jurisdictions, yet 
Dunnellon violators may not be similarly treated, at least in terms of 
the admissibility of evidence to challenge a photo-captured violation. 
3. Ordinances Creating Penalties Beyond Imposition of Monetary 
Fines 
The third instance of potentially problematic ordinances arises 
where the local authority sets forth specific penalties for an alleged 
violator who fails to respond to the issuance of a citation by ignoring 
the citation altogether and failing to pay the fine imposed for the vio-
lation.220  The traditional imposition of civil penalties has been upheld 
in the context of automated traffic systems based on the trend of judi-
cial restraint and legislative deference.221  Essentially, the imposition of 
civil, as opposed to criminal, penalties for photo-captured violations 
does not require any degree of heightened judicial review within the 
context of citation proceedings.222  
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Although the majority of municipalities utilizing automated sys-
tems impose a civil penalty and subsequent collections process for 
failure to pay the citation, the penalty scheme set forth in Sarasota 
County’s ordinance relating to photo-captured infractions imposes a 
strikingly stringent form of liability: “suspension of county privileges,” 
wherein an alleged violator’s failure to pay the civil fine will necessar-
ily lead to the suspension, refusal, and denial of “any rights and privi-
leges that such person may otherwise be entitled to enjoy, receive, or 
benefit from the County . . . .”223  Specifically, the potentially revocable 
rights and privileges of the county include “the right to obtain and 
maintain an occupational license, the right to utilize County facilities, 
the right to obtain any licenses or permits contemplated in the 
Code.”224 
The county’s imposition of a particularly stringent penalty 
scheme raises substantially more complex issues than the “mere civil 
fine” commonly imposed for photo-captured violations.225  Whereas 
the process due in the context of civil fines is less demanding since the 
penalty is limited to monetary loss, the county’s imposition of its own 
specific penalties far exceeds the scope of monetary fines — the fail-
ure to pay such fines necessarily requires an outright denial of an in-
dividual’s rights to lawfully pursue his occupation by obtaining an oc-
cupational license, to enjoy public facilities, to conduct business, and to 
travel lawfully by obtaining required licenses and permits.226  
The penalty scheme set forth in the county ordinance is poten-
tially troublesome in light of the heightened penalties and the re-
quirements of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.227  In the 
context of due process, the possibility for an outright denial of an indi-
vidual’s rights and privileges of the county would necessarily require a 
heightened standard for citation proceedings because the loss of these 
rights exceeds beyond the scope of a civil fine.228 Furthermore, in the 
context of equal protection, alleged violators adjudicated under the 
county’s jurisdiction may be similarly situated to those violators in 
other jurisdictions, yet the substantial restrictions imposed on indi-
viduals within the county far exceeds the imposition of civil penalties 
under jurisdictions outside the county.229  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Aside from the three particularly anomalous instances of poten-
tially challengeable ordinances, the statewide implementation of 
automated traffic detectors pursuant to the Mark Wandall Traffic 
Safety Act does not, in and of itself, necessarily violate an individual’s 
constitutional rights.  Specifically, so long as the state-implemented use 
of red-light cameras imposes only a civil penalty for violations cap-
tured therefrom, the degree of process due is substantially less strict 
than the imposition of a punitive, criminal penalty.  Based on this 
characterization, the photo-captured infractions are akin to, albeit 
more expansive than, a citation issued for an expired parking meter. 
The implementation of red-light camera equipment itself is not a 
particularly strong point of contention because local authorities un-
doubtedly have the authority to regulate traffic regulation and en-
forcement within their jurisdictions based on their police powers 
therein. Moreover, the monitoring of such images does not necessarily 
implicate any infringement on an individual’s diminished expectation 
of privacy in the context of public roadways.  Accordingly, the use of 
such systems to capture violations and issue citations therefrom gen-
erally avoids any challenges based on an individual’s constitutional 
rights protecting against self-incrimination and providing the oppor-
tunity to confront one’s accusers — so long as the penalties for photo-
captured violations is explicitly and implicitly characterized as a civil, 
non-punitive penalty.230  
However, the widespread public dissent against these automated 
infraction detectors is not necessarily an uphill battle once the focus of 
such challenges goes beyond individual constitutional analysis.  Spe-
cifically, judicial attention must be had for the actual realities of the 
internal affairs underlying the use of automated traffic systems.  
As a general trend, most challenges have focused on legislation, 
which, on its face, remains silent as to the use of private companies 
contracted to undertake the functions specifically delegated to local 
authorities, not to private entities.  In this context, challenges to the 
red-light cameras will remain relatively unsuccessful since both state 
statute and local ordinances generally comport with the exercise of 
police powers in the regulation and enforcement of traffic on state 
highways, roads, and streets.  
Nevertheless, the implementation of automated traffic infraction 
systems and the consequential public disdain stemming therefrom 
may be ameliorated by a legislative initiative to prohibit the use of 
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foreign companies conducting the tasks that lawfully belong within 
the geographic and legal jurisdictions of local authorities.  
Alternatively, the implementation of a statewide program 
wherein the state legislature retains the right to regulate the use of 
automated infraction detectors, ideally, under the sole supervision and 
control of the Department of Transportation would ensure uniformity 
and limit the opportunity for unfair or deceptive business dealings 
between municipalities and private companies.  
Ultimately, the introduction of innovative and cost-effective 
means of promoting public health, safety, and welfare is rapidly devel-
oping, and although the legal debate surrounding such innovations 
quickly gains momentum as the technologies become more wide-
spread, the articulation of standards set forth through coherent, con-
sistent, and cohesive jurisprudence develops at a substantially slower 
pace.  
All in all, the use of automated traffic infraction detectors will 
remain a familiar fixture of state-run thoroughfares.  However, if the 
current trend of local authorities contracting their police powers to 
private companies outside the state continues, the exercise of unbri-
dled discretion incidental to an outright delegation of local authority 
will continue to exacerbate the tension created between the use of 
such innovative technologies and the lack of public acceptance.  
Although the legislature is currently debating the repeal of the 
Traffic Safety Act altogether, this is merely a reflection of legislative 
frustration with the ever-growing public outcry against the automated 
systems.  Rather than throwing in the towel on automated traffic in-
fraction detectors, legislative attention must be had for the most effi-
cient means of regulating these systems in a uniform and consistent 
manner while limiting the possibility for privatizing and outsourcing 
traffic regulation and enforcement beyond state borders.  
 
